Casualties unknown

1998-11-04: Schweizer 269C (N2100B) — Baltimore Police Department — Baltimore, MD

Baltimore, MD, US

On November 4, 1998, a Schweizer 269C (registration N2100B) operated by Baltimore Police Department was involved in an aviation accident near Baltimore, MD. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: inadequate assembly instructions from the engine manufacturer which resulted in improper engine assembly, and subsequent power loss over unsuitable terrain, with insufficient altitude for a successful autorotation. This summary draws on records from the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) historical archive; 1 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

Sourcesthe U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) historical archivePrimary reportUpdated 1781061362Data APIEditorial standards

A police helicopter on a mission below 500 ft AGL experienced an engine failure. The pilot could not reach a suitable landing area; the helicopter struck obstacles and landed hard. Investigation found the #2 connecting rod separated from the crankshaft due to improperly tightened bolts. The engine had 45.7 total hours.

Incident

A police helicopter engaged in a mission at an altitude of less than 500 feet above ground level experienced a loss of engine power. The pilot was unable to reach a suitable landing area and could not maintain rotor rpm. The helicopter struck trees and a light pole, then landed hard on a road before sliding into a fence.

Examination Findings

Post-incident examination revealed that the #2 connecting rod had separated from the crankshaft. A torque check on the remaining connecting rod bolts found that all were below the minimum specified value.

Manufacturing Context

At the time of engine assembly, a work action (strike) was in effect at the engine manufacturer. Production continued with management and replacement workers. During assembly, the crankshaft had been replaced for an unknown reason. After the crankshaft replacement, new connecting rods were attached but were not properly tightened.

The replacement workers manned the two assembly stations identified as most probable for the replacement of the crankshaft and the failure to tighten the connecting rod bolts. Although long‑time employees knew the correct procedures for documentation of a replaced crankshaft, no specific written instructions were available for the replacement employees.

The engine failed at 45.7 hours total time.

Investigation report by the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) historical archive. Original record: https://carol.ntsb.gov/event/20001211X11437. This page is a structured re-presentation; facts and quotes are in the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), United States.