Fokker 50 Hydraulic Leak Incident at Stavanger Sola (G-UKTA)

Incident Overview and Immediate Response On 6 September 1999, at 1014 hours local time, a Fokker 50 with registration G-UKTA, operating as UKA 33T, was on a scheduled commercial flight from Stavanger airport Sola to Aberdeen. Shortly after take-off from runway 18, during the acceleration period, the crew transmitted an urgency message, PAN, on frequency 119.6 MHz, reporting problems with the hydraulic systems and a possible leakage. In the cockpit, the crew received a flap asymmetry warning, closely followed by a low hydraulic quantity warning, which momentarily preceded a double hydraulic failure warning. The crew requested air traffic control to inspect the runway and taxiways for fluid, but none was found while the aircraft was airborne. As the fluid location could not be confirmed, it was presumed that the hydraulic fluid had been vented to the atmosphere. The crew decided to return to the departure airport and requested a re-clearance. ## Landing and Aftermath The crew was instructed to hold in a safe area west of the aerodrome while systems were investigated and relevant pre-landing procedures for the return landing were carried out. G-UKTA was given a priority landing, and the airport emergency services were activated. The aircraft made a normal landing on runway 18, and from the control tower there were no visible indications of difficulties. After the roll-out, the aircraft came to a standstill on the runway abeam taxiway A, as the nose wheel steering was inoperative. The aircraft was towed to the Braathens hangar for repair. The runway had to be cleaned for a hydraulic oil spill and was closed for approximately five minutes. ## Investigation and Reporting The Aircraft Accident Investigation Board of Norway (AAIB/N) compiled this report based on limited information, including a routine report from ATC at Stavanger airport Sola with extracts from the control tower log and a short summary from the KLM uk Flight Safety Manager dated 14 February 2000. The KLM uk summary stated that the investigation was completed and reported to their Civil Aviation Authority at the end of October 1999. The incident highlighted that the available information for foreign aircrew about national regulations for reporting incidents and accidents was not satisfactory. The AAIB/N noted a need for clarification on how and when aircrew on foreign registered and operated aircraft should report incidents occurring on Norwegian territory, referencing ICAO Annex 6, Chapter 3, item 3.2. To facilitate timely and adequate reporting, the AAIB/N initiated procedures and the publishing of complementary information to improve reporting routines.