Casualties unknown

Power Fluctuations in Both Engines During Cruise in Icing Conditions (N394AE)

San Antonio, TX, US

On January 10, 2001, a Saab 340B (registration N394AE) operated by American Eagle Airlines, Inc. was involved in an aviation accident near San Antonio, TX. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: Power fluctuations in both engines as a result of ice ingestion. This summary draws on records from the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) historical archive; 5 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

Sourcesthe U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) historical archivePrimary reportUpdated 2026-06-10Data APIEditorial standards

A flight in cruise encountered icing conditions, leading to momentary power fluctuations in both engines due to ice ingestion. The aircraft descended and landed safely after the fluctuations ceased.

Incident Description

The flight was in cruise, operating in icing conditions, when both engines experienced momentary power fluctuations (PF) as a result of ice ingestion. The aircraft descended, the power fluctuations ceased, and the flight proceeded to land at its intended destination.

Power Fluctuation Events

Evaluation of the flight data recorder information revealed that the left engine experienced four Type II (compressor stall) PF events, and the right engine experienced one Type I (partial/full quenching of the engine's combustor flame) PF event and one Type II event.

Fleet Research and Certification History

The Saab 340 fleet has undergone extensive research regarding power fluctuations since it was certified in the U.S. in 1985. In 1985, it was determined that ice accumulates on the engine inlet splitter lip, breaks off, and enters the engine, resulting in a flame-out. An auto-ignition system was developed to provide a means to re-light the engine.

Aircraft certification rules require that no accumulation of engine inlet ice occur that will adversely affect engine operation. In 2000, the FAA's position was that even though no re-design of the engine inlet was found that would preclude ice accumulation on the splitter lip, the risk associated with a PF event was acceptable. Furthermore, the FAA determined that the risk of a dual engine power loss due to the existence of an icing condition and failure of both engines' auto-ignition systems was acceptably low. Lastly, the FAA stated that inappropriate crew response risks associated with PFs combined with an in-flight shut down were quantitatively indeterminate, but deemed qualitatively acceptable by FAA certification pilots and human factors specialists.

Probable cause

Power fluctuations in both engines as a result of ice ingestion.

Investigation report by the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) historical archive. Original record: https://carol.ntsb.gov/event/20010205X00393. This page is a structured re-presentation; facts and quotes are in the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), United States.