Casualties unknown

Engine Power Surge During Pushback After Maintenance Test (N1457B)

Boston, MA, US

On February 6, 2001, a Fokker F28 MK 0100 (registration N1457B) was involved in an aviation accident near Boston, MA. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: the failure of the flight crew to follow the checklist prior to engine start, and their subsequent diverted attention during engine start. This summary draws on records from the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) historical archive.

Sourcesthe U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) historical archivePrimary reportUpdated 2026-06-10Data APIEditorial standards

During pushback, both engines surged to high power, causing the aircraft to strike the tug. The engines accelerated to the throttle position from a prior automated maintenance test, and checklist deviations occurred.

Incident Description

During engine start while being pushed back, both engines unexpectedly increased to a high power setting. The resulting forward movement of the aircraft caused a pin to shear, the tow bar to bend, and the tug to be struck.

Maintenance Testing

Prior to engine start, maintenance personnel had conducted an automated check that included automatic movements of the control wheel and throttles. The flight crew returned to their seats while the test was in progress. Upon completion of the test, the airplane was returned to service and maintenance personnel left the cockpit.

Flight Crew Actions

The captain initiated the BEFORE STARTING ENGINES checklist without either pilot first completing a cockpit flow setup, which was required by company procedures. The checklist was then interrupted by a cockpit visitor, leading to a non-pertinent conversation lasting 3½ minutes. When the checklist was resumed, several items had been missed. As the checklist continued, the first officer called out "THRUST LEVERS," and the captain correctly responded "CLOSED."

Pushback was initiated, and the captain verbalized starting the first engine as required by the checklist. During the start of the first engine, the captain began another non-pertinent conversation with the first officer. The second engine was then started without the required verbalization per company checklist procedures.

Checklist Procedure Deviations

Company checklist procedures made both pilots responsible for ensuring a normal engine start. However, neither pilot detected that the engines were accelerating above normal idle. Follow-up testing revealed that the engines accelerated to a power setting corresponding to the last position of the throttles at the completion of the automated test conducted by maintenance.

Investigation report by the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) historical archive. Original record: https://carol.ntsb.gov/event/20010223X00504. This page is a structured re-presentation; facts and quotes are in the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), United States.