Casualties unknown

2001-03-06: DE Havilland DHC-8-102 (N822PH) — Horizon Air Industries, Inc. — Portland, OR

Portland, OR, US

On March 6, 2001, a DE Havilland DHC-8-102 (registration N822PH) operated by Horizon Air Industries, Inc. was involved in an aviation accident near Portland, OR. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The failure of the number 5 engine bearing assembly followed by the disconnection of the P2.5/P3 switching valve to rear inlet case sealing air tube and the melting of the NL probe port (sealing tube) which allowed an oil fed fire beyond the constraints of… This summary draws on records from the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) historical archive; 3 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

Sourcesthe U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) historical archivePrimary reportUpdated 1781061362Data APIEditorial standards

An engine fire occurred on a Horizon Air DHC-8-102 during approach to Portland. Investigation found a #5 bearing failure, disconnected tubes, and oil-fed fire. Required maintenance and service bulletins were not implemented.

Incident Overview

On approach to Portland International Airport in Oregon, Horizon Air flight 2325, a de Havilland DHC-8-102, experienced an engine fire in a Pratt & Whitney PW120A engine. The aircraft was operating a scheduled flight under 14 CFR Part 121.

Examination Findings

An examination and teardown of the affected engine revealed that the #5 bearing assembly had failed. Further inspection identified that the P2.5/P3 switching valve to rear inlet case sealing air tube had become disconnected. Additionally, the NL probe port sealing tube had melted. These failures allowed an oil-fed fire to propagate outside the engine casing and into the engine compartment.

Maintenance and Service Bulletin Compliance

The investigation determined that the engine had not been placed on oil consumption and daily chip detector examination by company maintenance, as required by the engine maintenance manual. This oversight followed a loss of oil event that occurred approximately 180 flight hours before the fire.

Furthermore, the mandatory implementation of Pratt & Whitney service bulletin 20914, which addressed the sealing air tube and NL probe port sealing tube, was not carried out by the company. However, it was also not required under FAA regulations, as the airworthiness directive that made the service bulletin mandatory did not include the PW120A engine.

Additionally, the investigation revealed that another service bulletin, Pratt & Whitney 21446R3, whose implementation was mandated by the company, was not carried out during an earlier hot section inspection and immediately preceding the earlier oil loss event.

Conclusion

The engine fire on Horizon Air flight 2325 was the result of a bearing failure and the failure of sealing tubes, combined with the lack of required maintenance actions and non-implementation of relevant service bulletins.

Investigation report by the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) historical archive. Original record: https://carol.ntsb.gov/event/20010308X00571. This page is a structured re-presentation; facts and quotes are in the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), United States.