Approach and Landing
The pilots initiated an approach to runway 6L, which was snow covered and had a useable landing distance of 6,000 feet. Inside the final approach fix, the captain elected to land with the wing flaps set at 22 degrees rather than 45 degrees due to the wind. The Vref was adjusted to 138 knots. However, the final 38 seconds of flight was above 138 knots, and the final 7 seconds of flight was above 150 knots. In the final eight seconds of flight, the radar altimeter was less than 15 feet. The pilot continued with the landing and did not execute a go-around. Touchdown occurred at an airspeed of 150 knots, about 1,523 feet from the departure end of the runway, and 2,308 feet from the ILS localizer antenna, which the airplane struck after it overran the runway.
Wind Conditions
The last winds from the tower were 340 degrees at 22 knots, with gusts to 35 knots. The maximum demonstrated crosswind for the airplane was 30 knots.
Landing Performance
According to the company flight manual, with flaps set at 22 degrees and a wet runway, the actual landing distance would have been 4,260 feet. When interviewed, the flight crew reported they had not checked landing distance.
Communication and NOTAM
The ATIS contained runway condition data that was 1 hour old. The FAA had published a NOTAM 26 days prior to the accident, which raised the landing minimums for the runway from 4,000 ft RVR to 5,000 ft RVR. The NOTAM was not in the airline's database, and the company had no backup method for determining if they had all NOTAMs. The last RVR transmitted to the flight crew was 4,000 ft. The local controller did not update the flight crew with the latest RVR or braking action reports as required. There was no requirement for the local controller to notify the pilots that the airport was below landing minimums, even though the controllers were required to be aware of the approach minimums.