Casualties unknown

2005-03-09: British Aerospace BAE-125-700A (N703TS) — Joel Neuman — Teterboro, NJ

Teterboro, NJ, US

On March 9, 2005, a British Aerospace BAE-125-700A (registration N703TS) operated by Joel Neuman was involved in an aviation accident near Teterboro, NJ. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The pilot in command's inadequate in-flight planning, which resulted in an overrun landing on a contaminated runway. Factors were inadequate crew coordination, gusty winds, and a slush covered runway. This summary draws on records from the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) historical archive.

Sourcesthe U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) historical archivePrimary reportUpdated 1781061362Data APIEditorial standards

A flight crew that had not previously flown together experienced communication issues during an approach to a slush-contaminated runway. The copilot did not relay runway condition information, and the crew missed transmissions due to turbulence. The previous aircraft's braking report was based on thrust reversers, which the incident aircraft lacked.

Incident Overview

On the day of the incident, the pilot and copilot were paired for the first time. The copilot spoke broken English and obtained the ATIS information approximately 150 miles from the airport. The ATIS reported thin slush on all runway surfaces. However, the captain did not inquire about runway conditions, and the copilot did not convey this information to the captain.

Approach and Weather

The flight crew continued the approach in moderate to severe turbulence. While performing pre-landing checks, the turbulence caused the crew to miss several radio transmissions. Among the missed transmissions were a go-around report from a preceding aircraft and a subsequent report of good braking action from that same aircraft.

The incident airplane turned onto final approach for runway 01, which was 7,000 feet long and 150 feet wide, with an asphalt surface. During the final approach, the landing gear was down and flaps were set to 25 degrees. Air Traffic Control (ATC) relayed the previous aircraft's good braking action report to the incident crew. However, the preceding aircraft was equipped with thrust reversers, while the incident aircraft was not. ATC also provided two wind checks during the final approach: 340 degrees at 15 knots, and later 340 degrees at 20 knots.

Landing Considerations

Due to the wind conditions, the pilot flew the final approach without full flaps, maintaining a speed of Vref plus 20 knots (139 knots). The speed was reduced to 134 knots over the runway threshold. According to the Aeronautical Information Manual Pilot/Controller Glossary, a runway is considered contaminated when standing water, ice, snow, slush, frost, heavy rubber, or other substances are present.

A review of the “Effect of Slippery Runway on Landing Distance” chart from the FAA-approved airplane flight manual indicated that the equivalent scheduled landing distance available for the contaminated 7,000-foot runway was approximately 3,200 feet. Additionally, a takeoff and landing data (TOLD) card retrieved from the cockpit showed that a landing weight of 20,000 pounds with full flaps and a speed of 119 knots required 4,240 feet of runway on a dry surface.

The combination of these factors—including the unrelayed runway condition, turbulence-induced missed communications, the differing equipment of the preceding aircraft, and the approach speed adjustments—contributed to the circumstances of the incident.

Investigation report by the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) historical archive. Original record: https://carol.ntsb.gov/event/20050311X00303. This page is a structured re-presentation; facts and quotes are in the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), United States.