Background
Earlier on the day of the accident, the pilot informed several company employees about a discrepancy with the No. 2 position tow-release hook. He was advised to use only the Nos. 1 and 3 positions. The pilot then conducted a banner tow flight, returning and dropping the banner without reported issues. He picked up a second banner on the No. 3 position, flew it, and returned to drop it. A company employee noted that the pilot released the second banner late; when asked, the pilot said the No. 3 release was not working properly.
Flight Events
The pilot installed banner tow hooks at the Nos. 1 and 3 positions. He departed to pick up a billboard using the No. 1 position but reported the airplane would not climb, so he released the banner. He then discarded the No. 3 hook and returned to pick up the billboard, which was set up for an easterly direction. He approached at 85 mph. During climb-out, he described it as "even worse. I had no thrust or power at all, only the momentum carried me up to 200 [feet] where I leveled off with an airspeed of about 55 mph and noticed low oil pressure while losing altitude." He immediately pulled the No. 3 banner release handle, but "everything came out the panel." He then felt "pulled by the tail with no thrust" and braced for impact on airport property. No ground crew reported hearing an engine discrepancy during the climb.
Postaccident Examination
Examination of the airplane revealed that the tow rope remained secured to the No. 3 tow-release hook. A safety link designed to break at 650 pounds was installed between the hook and rope. The operator reported that the safety link will not break due to a "hot hook" or a banner dragging on the ground. The No. 3 banner release handle and cable assembly had separated from the instrument panel and extended about 12 inches into the cockpit. The cable was not fractured. The cable housing was secured by a plastic tie-wrap near the pilot's seat, then by three adel clamps. The closest adel clamp to the cockpit was about 10 feet aft of the plastic tie-wrap. The cable housing was required to be clamped by six adel clamps. Engine operational testing produced approximately 2,400 rpm (near full static) with a serviceable propeller. Oil pressure was in the green arc above 1,700 rpm, but indicated low at 1,000 and 1,300 rpm.
Operational Factors
A METAR taken about 5 minutes after the accident indicated wind from 270 degrees at 7 knots, but the ground crew had set up for an east approach. The operator's training manual stated that "Downwind pickups are not to be attempted by any pilot at any time! Failure to abide by this rule will result in the pilots' immediate termination!" It further indicated that if wind direction changes such that the banner is not set up into the wind, the pilot must land, taxi to the banner area, and help realign the banner for an upwind pickup.