Incident Overview
As the flight approached Fort Lauderdale/Hollywood International Airport, the crew prepared for a visual approach and advised the controller the field was in sight. The pilot reported being distracted while locating the runway. The copilot stated he read from checklists, but the cockpit voice recorder captured no challenge-response callouts. During landing, the aircraft touched down with the landing gear retracted and slid approximately 2,600 feet before stopping. The aircraft sustained substantial damage to a structural component and fire damage to the bottom of the fuselage. After touchdown, the pilot asked what happened to the landing gear and the copilot responded, "We never put it down."
Landing Gear Warning System
The aircraft was equipped with an audible landing gear warning system intended to alert the crew when the gear was not extended while the aircraft was configured for landing. The cockpit voice recorder captured no sounds associated with the landing gear warning horn, and the pilot reported not hearing a warning. Postaccident testing of the landing gear system showed normal operation using both normal and emergency extension systems, and the cockpit visual annunciators and standby indicators correctly indicated landing gear position. However, the audible warning system did not function. Examination of the electrical wiring revealed a wire labeled "68CA8" that was fractured and separated from the "CA" relay, rendering the warning horn inoperative. Metallurgical examination indicated the fracture features were consistent with overstress, but the source of the overstress was not identified.
Maintenance History
According to maintenance records, the CA relay and its immediate area were inspected 7 months and 22 days before the incident, and the aircraft had operated for 60 hours (43 cycles) since that inspection. The aircraft manufacturer stated that no preflight test exists for flight crews to check the audible landing gear warning system. However, because the audible gear warning system and the cabin altitude warning system shared the CA relay, the fractured wire would also have disabled the cabin altitude warning system. The operational status of the cabin altitude warning system is a preflight check item. Thus, an inoperative cabin altitude warning could have been detected during preflight. Review of maintenance and discrepancy records found no indication that flight crews had previously reported an inoperative cabin altitude warning, and the accident crew did not provide information about their preflight observations. Therefore, it could not be determined when the wire fracture occurred.
Flight Crew Certification
The pilot held a U.S. commercial airman certificate issued based on his Mexican pilot license, but the investigation determined that certificate was not valid for carrying persons for compensation or hire. FAA records showed the pilot did not hold a U.S. airman medical certificate, and his certificate lacked a type rating for the incident aircraft or an instrument rating (the flight was operated under instrument flight rules). Additionally, the pilot had not completed a pilot proficiency check within the preceding 12 months. The copilot held only a U.S. private pilot certificate, also based on a Mexican license, without an instrument rating. The FAA determined these discrepancies represented noncompliance with numerous Federal Aviation Regulations. According to the FARs, the pilot was not authorized to act as pilot-in-command, and the copilot was not authorized to act as a required crewmember for the flight. However, there was insufficient evidence to indicate that these discrepancies were directly related to the cause of the incident.
Aftermath
The aircraft sustained substantial damage and fire damage to the underside of the fuselage. No statement about injuries or fatalities is provided in the source.