No fatalities

19 Jan 2012: M-SQUARED AIRCRAFT BREESE 2 (N582MS) — M SQUARED AIRCRAFT — Bayou La Batre, AL

Bayou La Batre, AL, United States

On 19 Jan 2012, a M-SQUARED AIRCRAFT BREESE 2 (registration N582MS) operated by M SQUARED AIRCRAFT was involved in an aviation accident near Bayou La Batre, AL. No fatalities were reported. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The pilot's inability to maintain control of the airplane for reasons that could not be determined because postaccident examination of the rudder control system did not reveal any anomalies that would have precluded control of the airplane. This summary draws on records from NTSB; 2 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

SourcesNTSBPrimary reportUpdated 1778583330Data APIEditorial standards

On January 19, 2012, a student pilot deployed the ballistic recovery system of an M-Squared Breese 2 after experiencing rudder and elevator control issues. The aircraft was substantially damaged; the pilot was not injured.

Accident Overview

On January 19, 2012, at approximately 1630 central standard time, an M-Squared Breese 2 special light sport aircraft (S-LSA), registration N582MS, operated by M-Squared Aircraft, was substantially damaged when it impacted the ground after the student pilot activated the airplane's ballistic recovery system (BRS) parachute shortly after takeoff from Roy E. Ray Airport (5R7) in Bayou La Batre, Alabama. The student pilot was not injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan had been filed for the local instructional flight conducted under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.

Flight Sequence

The student pilot reported departing St. Elmo Airport (2R5) in St. Elmo, Alabama, with a flight instructor, flying to 5R7, and completing three landings without incident. The flight instructor then exited the airplane. The student pilot performed a full-stop landing without incident. During the subsequent climb after takeoff, the airplane yawed to the right, nearly 90 degrees to the runway. The student pilot was unable to depress the left rudder pedal more than 1 or 2 inches, and the right rudder pedal moved without resistance. He also noticed that the elevator control felt "loose and sloppy."

The student pilot made several unsuccessful attempts to descend while maintaining a straight heading and determined that he could not safely land the airplane. He elected to maneuver over a field, where he deployed the airplane's BRS parachute and reduced engine power. The parachute became partially entangled on the propeller, and the airplane impacted the ground on its front left side. The forward portion of the fuselage was substantially damaged.

Postaccident Examination

A Federal Aviation Administration inspector examined the airplane and found that the tail skid/rudder control tube was fractured. The rudder pedals were displaced during impact, but all connections remained intact. No other discrepancies were observed in the flight control system.

The fractured tube was sent to the NTSB Materials Laboratory for further examination. Metallurgical examination revealed that the tube consisted of a 1-inch diameter outer tube and a 0.875-inch diameter inner tube. The tube was circumferentially fractured through both tubes at the bolted connection to a diagonal brace extending to the leading edge of the horizontal stabilizer. The fracture bisected the fore and aft mounting holes for the diagonal brace and was below the rudder hinge point.

Magnified examinations showed shear lips and features indicative of overstress separations in both tubes. No progressive cracking or corrosion was noted. The deformation pattern and fracture plane geometry were consistent with bending overstress separation. The fracture location was the fulcrum of the bending, and deformation was consistent with the lower end of the tube being displaced forward.

Hardness and electrical conductivity measurements showed both tubes met required properties per the manufacturer's source control documents, but the outer tube's values were at the minimum specified in MIL-G-6088G. The tail skid tube was abraded completely through the lower wall, with abrasions from forward to aft, consistent with contact during forward motion with a positive pitch attitude.

Pilot and Aircraft Information

The student pilot reported 14 hours of total flight experience, all accumulated during the previous 30 days in the same make and model as the accident airplane.

The high-wing, tubular-constructed, tricycle-gear airplane, serial number 721, was issued a special airworthiness certificate in the light-sport category on July 22, 2008. It was equipped with a Rotax 582 series, 65-horsepower engine mounted in a pusher configuration. At the time of the accident, the airplane had operated about 575 total hours since new, and 75 hours since its most recent condition inspection on September 30, 2011.

Contributing factors

Rudder control systemStudent pilot