History of Flight
On November 3, 2012, at about 2245 eastern daylight time, a Hughes OH-6A helicopter, registration N368PD, collided with power lines and terrain while maneuvering in Atlanta, Georgia. The helicopter was operated by the Atlanta Police Department (APD) on a public use flight to support ground personnel in locating a missing child. The flight originated from Hartsfield Jackson Atlanta International Airport (ATL) at 2224. Night, visual meteorological conditions prevailed; no flight plan was filed.
The commercial pilot occupied the right cockpit seat, and a pilot-rated tactical flight officer (TFO) occupied the left seat. Recorded APD voice communications indicated the TFO made positional calls, including "three minutes out," "two minutes out," and "26" (on station). No distress calls were received. Radar data showed the helicopter traveling southbound across Interstate 20 at about 1,300 feet mean sea level (msl), then making a left turn of about 270 degrees to a westerly heading. The last three radar returns placed the helicopter at 1,200 feet msl (about 200 feet above ground level), approximately 0.17 nautical miles east of the accident site.
Multiple witnesses observed the accident. An APD officer in her personal vehicle saw the helicopter traveling northwest with its searchlight on and pointed down; she heard sparking sounds, then the searchlight disappeared, followed by two loud explosions and the helicopter engulfed in flames. Another APD officer saw an explosion from a transformer and then the helicopter falling to the street and exploding. A witness sitting on a wall reported the helicopter flying "very low," hitting a transformer, and "nose-diving" into the street. Another witness observed the helicopter's bottom catch wires, causing it to flip over and explode. A witness on a balcony saw the helicopter make two complete circles at low altitude before striking wires on a third circle. Several witnesses noted the engine sounded normal and the searchlight was on.
Personnel Information
The pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with a rotorcraft-helicopter rating. According to his September 27, 2012 medical certificate application, he had 2,900 total flight hours, including 70 in the previous six months. His logbook recorded about 2,933 total hours, all in helicopters, with about 2,354 hours of night time. His last annual flight review/unit check ride was on March 6, 2012, in a MD Helicopters 369E.
The TFO held a commercial pilot certificate with airplane single-engine, multiengine, and instrument ratings but no rotorcraft rating. His medical certificate application, dated August 8, 2012, reported 600 total flight hours, with 0 hours in the previous six months. He was receiving on-the-job training and was not yet fully qualified as a TFO.
Aircraft Information
The helicopter was a single-engine, high-skid (extended gear) Hughes OH-6A, serial number 1180900, manufactured in 1967. It was powered by a Rolls-Royce T63-A720 engine rated at 420 shaft horsepower. Equipment included a Spectrolab Nightsun SX-5 searchlight and a thermal imaging (FLIR) system; it was not equipped with night vision goggles. The most recent annual inspection was on August 23, 2012, at an airframe total time of 6,528.7 hours; engine total time was 1,794.5 hours.
Meteorological Information
The 2053 surface weather observation at Fulton County Airport (FTY), about 3 miles northwest of the accident site, reported sky clear, calm wind, and visibility 10 statute miles or greater.
Wreckage and Impact Information
The helicopter struck wires atop a 42-foot-high power pole near the intersection of two roads. The road elevation at the main wreckage was about 1,010 feet. The main wreckage came to rest in the center of the road, and a post-crash fire ensued. Several loose, unused ammunition rounds were observed on the street near the fuselage. Utility crews replaced the wires, which showed arcing and impact damage; support structures and ceramic insulators were damaged. All main rotor blades were accounted for; the tail boom separated from the fuselage. Signatures consistent with wire contact were found on the tail boom and one main rotor blade.
Post-accident examination at a recovery facility revealed extensive fire damage. The cockpit and cabin were completely consumed; the aft fuselage ("turtle back") was protected by a stainless steel firewall and remained unburned. The mast, main rotor hub, and flight controls above the mast rails were generally undamaged by fire. The transmission rotated by hand without binding; no chip detector debris was observed. The engine, though heat damaged, showed no obvious pre-impact failures. The tail rotor transmission rotated normally. The extended landing gear assembly was broken away from the fuselage.
Medical and Pathological Information
Postmortem examinations of both crew members were performed by the Fulton County Medical Examiner. The pilot's cause of death was blunt force head injuries, manner accidental. Forensic toxicology by the FAA CAMI laboratory found no carbon monoxide, cyanide, ethanol, or drugs. The TFO's cause of death was blunt force chest trauma and thermal injury, manner accidental; toxicology similarly found no impairing substances.
Tests and Research
Engine examination at Rolls-Royce facilities on January 22, 2013, found nothing that would prevent normal operation. Rotational scoring signatures indicated engine operation at impact. The power turbine governor and fuel control unit remained in normal positions, with blackening from fire. Subsequent disassembly of the fuel control unit and governor at Honeywell on May 14, 2013, revealed no failed parts that would preclude normal operation.
Additional Information
Interviews with APD Helicopter Unit personnel on November 15, 2012, provided context. The accident flight was the first of the day; the evening shift began at 1600 and the crew reported for duty then. A call for a missing child prompted the flight. The unit's Standard Operating Procedure ranked missing children as priority 6 (scale 1-9, with 1 highest). A flight crew reading file entry stated aircraft should remain at 500 feet agl until in contact with the ground unit, which would then authorize lower altitudes. However, one pilot noted that discerning a missing child from 500 feet at night would be impossible without a lower altitude.
Pilots generally regarded the accident pilot as meticulous, capable, and competent, with good local knowledge and a preference for night flying. One pilot noted a tendency for the accident pilot to fly low. The unit's safety culture was described as "very strong" with a "knock it off" policy if safety dictated. The unit had a Safety Officer who produced a monthly newsletter but no formal risk assessment program at the time. On July 3, 2013, the APD Helicopter Unit implemented a flight risk assessment tool evaluating weather, pilot experience, TFO experience, call type, and other factors to determine approval level.