History of Flight
On April 4, 2014, about 2318 Pacific daylight time, a ship pilot was seriously injured when he was being transferred via external sling from an Agusta AW109SP helicopter, registration N361CR, to a container ship that was inbound to the Columbia River mouth near Astoria, Oregon. The helicopter was operated by Brim Aviation, and the ship pilot was a member of the Columbia River Bar Pilots. Neither the helicopter nor the ship was damaged, and none of the three helicopter crewmembers were injured. The flight was conducted as a Class D external load operation under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 133. Light rain and night meteorological conditions prevailed, and a company visual flight rules flight plan was filed.
Crew and Aircraft Information
The helicopter crew consisted of three persons: the pilot, the co-pilot, and the hoist operator. The helicopter pilot had about 5,655 total hours of helicopter flight experience, including about 555 in the subject helicopter make and model, and 396 hours at night. The pilot was seated in the right seat and was the flying pilot. The co-pilot had about 7,115 total hours, including about 593 hours at night, and was seated in the left seat. The hoist operator was a former US Coast Guard hoist operator, positioned on the right side of the helicopter.
The helicopter was manufactured in 2011 and equipped with two Pratt & Whitney 207C series turboshaft engines.
The Transfer and Accident
According to the crewmembers, they intercepted the ship when it was in the Pacific Ocean, about 15 miles from the mouth of the Columbia River, with the mission to deliver the ship pilot onto the ship while the ship was underway. When the helicopter arrived, the ship pilot and helicopter crew spent several minutes determining a suitable location to lower and deposit the ship pilot. They agreed on a small open area near the starboard bow.
When the helicopter was stationary relative to the ship for lowering, the pilot could only see a small portion of the ship's bow area. Just as the ship pilot touched down on the deck, the helicopter pilot lost visual reference with the ship, and the helicopter began drifting aft relative to the ship. The hoist operator could not pay out cable fast enough to prevent pulling the ship pilot off the deck and then aft. The hoist operator then lost sight of the ship pilot and sheared the hoist cable. The ship pilot fell a few feet to the ship. He recovered from the fall and successfully piloted the ship through the Columbia River mouth to its destination. Upon disembarkation, he went directly to the hospital, where he was diagnosed with a fractured scapula.
Ship and Rendezvous Information
The ship was of German registry, about 730 feet in length with a beam of approximately 100 feet. At the time of the event, the ship was on a heading of 150 degrees magnetic at a speed of 17 knots. Visibility was about 10 miles under an overcast of unspecified height, with rain falling and wind from the south-southwest at about 15 knots, resulting in a relative wind on the starboard bow.
Background on Pilot Transfer Operations
The Oregon Board of Maritime Pilots (OBMP) regulates bar pilots; the Columbia River Bar Pilots (CRBP) provides pilots for ships transiting the mouth of the Columbia River. Helicopters have accounted for approximately 70 percent of bar pilot transfers in recent years, and this was the first accident involving a helicopter. CRBP defined transfer guidance is published in NOAA's Coast Pilot Volume 7, which notes that the primary method of pilot boarding is by helicopter and that pilot boats are kept on standby. The guidance includes deck preparations such as checking that no wires or aerials are above the helicopter maneuvering zone and that no loose objects are in or near the zone.
CRBP typically contacts inbound ships via VHF radio when they are 3 hours from arrival and again when 15 miles out. During these contacts, transfer procedures and mode are discussed. As a precaution, bar pilots often proceed with the mindset that the ship is not properly configured and reconnoiter to determine viability of the transfer.
Post-Accident Evaluation
The CRBP conducted its own evaluation and crafted a report adopted by the OBMP. The report determined that the decision to use the helicopter was normal and concluded that all involved personnel conducted themselves appropriately. The report cited four lessons learned, including recommendations for ship crew presence at the hoist location and for ship and helicopter crews to make every effort to establish an agreed-upon safe place, with the ship faxing its stow plan to the helicopter operator.