Casualties unknown

2014-12-14: Airbus Helicopters AS 350 B3 (LN-OWE) — Nord Helikopter AS — Flatoy, Hordaland, Norway, NO

Flatoy, Hordaland, Norway, NO

On December 14, 2014, an Airbus Helicopters AS 350 B3 (registration LN-OWE) operated by Nord Helikopter AS was involved in an aviation accident near Flatoy, Hordaland, Norway, NO. This summary draws on records from the Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority (NSIA); 1 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

Sourcesthe Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority (NSIA)Primary reportUpdated 1785682894Data APIEditorial standards

A serious incident occurred on December 14, 2014, when a helicopter's tail rotor struck stacked concrete elements during landing at Flatøy, Meland. The aircraft sustained damage to the vertical fin and rotor blades; no injuries were reported.

Introduction

On Sunday, December 14, 2014, at 1055 local time, an Airbus Helicopters AS 350 B3 (registration LN-OWE) was involved in a serious incident during a landing at Flatøy, Meland in Hordaland, Norway. The helicopter was operated by Nord Helikopter AS and was performing an aerial work flight involving the transport of equipment to a mobile base station.

Flight Details

Before the flight, the pilot-in-command and a loadmaster inspected the landing site by car. The site was described as 'OK, but somewhat tight,' bounded by a low-voltage power line to the south, a wall to the north, and concrete elements to the west. The area measured approximately 20 × 20 meters, which met company guidelines. Weather conditions included southeast wind with gusts, good visibility, sporadic rain showers of varying intensity, moderate turbulence, and daylight. The flight took off at 1040 with three persons on board: the pilot, loadmaster, and a passenger. No flight plan was filed, and the flight was conducted under Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) in uncontrolled Class G airspace.

Incident Sequence

Upon arrival at Flatøy, the pilot conducted a reconnaissance orbit to assess conditions around the mast point. The approach was made from the west, into the wind. At the time, precipitation increased and turbulence decreased as the helicopter descended to tree-top height. Rain settled on the windscreen as speed reduced. Following standard procedure, the loadmaster opened the door and looked out, confirming clear behind. No communication was established with personnel on the ground.

During the final approach, the pilot observed a person standing unfavorably far onto the landing area. He continued the approach while maintaining a safe distance from the person. When the helicopter was approximately 2 meters above the ground, the pilot felt contact with an object. A small bang occurred, followed by high-frequency vibrations. The pilot suspected the tail rotor and noted that the helicopter remained in stable hover. He lifted a few feet and moved forward 4–5 meters to increase distance from the obstacle behind before landing normally.

Damage

The tail section had contacted the edge of stacked concrete elements arranged like steps. The lower vertical fin and tail rotor protector were bent approximately 10 cm to the left, and the outer portions of both tail rotor blades were sheared off. No injuries were reported among the three occupants. Other than the helicopter, no property damage occurred.

Investigation Observations

The investigation noted that the pilot had prepared well and was familiar with the landing site and obstacles. The presence of a person on the landing area was an unforeseen complication. Without ground communication, the pilot's means to manage this challenge were limited. He continued the approach with increased safety margin to the person but did not notice that the margin to obstacles below was thereby reduced. The pilot later mentioned that perhaps the knowledge that the area was well-suited and large enough made him less vigilant than he might otherwise have been, and that reduced visibility may have been a factor. The aircraft was equipped with a factory-installed Appareo Vision 1000 recorder, but the memory card and internal memory lacked data from the incident flight despite efforts to recover data. The accident investigation board (SHT) highlighted the importance of recorders and adherence to regulations regarding their use.

Investigation report by the Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority (NSIA). Original record: https://nsia.no/Aviation/Aviation/Published-reports/2015-03. This page is a structured re-presentation; facts and quotes are in the Norwegian Safety Investigation Authority (NSIA) / Statens havarikommisjon, Norway.