Incident Overview
On 8 July 2015, a Piaggio P180 Avanti departed from Szczecin-Goleniów Airport (EPSC) bound for Milan-Linate Airport (LIML). The aircraft was observed on radar by the ACC GAT controller climbing after takeoff to FL120 on a heading of 180–190 degrees. At 10:38 UTC, the aircraft violated active restricted airspace EP TSA 10A.
Timeline of Events
The following sequence was documented:
- 10:31:00: The P180 departed EPSC and was handed over to Bremen ACC.
- 10:35:10: The aircraft appeared on the ACC GAT radar display at FL085 with a southerly heading.
- 10:36:20: The planner controller of ACC sector B inquired about the aircraft's intentions from the EPSC tower controller, who responded that the aircraft was turning to 210 degrees and was in contact with Bremen ACC. Bremen ACC was unaware of the TSA 10A activation.
- 10:36:25: The planned route via BODLA and RAKIT waypoints was displayed; the aircraft maintained a southerly heading.
- 10:36:50: ACC sector B notified Bremen ACC of the aircraft's approach to the active TSA and suggested a turn to a westerly heading, but this was not possible due to thunderstorm clouds. A climb to FL145 to overfly the area was coordinated.
- 10:37:20: A yellow "ZN" alert appeared on radar.
- 10:37:25: The Polish Airspace Management Cell (AMC) was informed of the incursion.
- 10:38:00: EPSC tower reported the P180 turning to 270 degrees after coordination with Bremen ACC.
- 10:38:15: A red "ZN" alert appeared on radar; the aircraft crossed the TSA 10A boundary.
- 10:38:35: Bremen ACC reported the aircraft passing FL140 and requested clearance to proceed direct to MAREM.
- 10:39:10: The aircraft passed FL150 and the "ZN" warning disappeared.
- 10:44:00: Bremen ACC stated they had received the aircraft from EPSC tower on a southerly heading and attempted to turn it west, but weather prevented this.
Investigation Findings
The investigation established the following facts:
- The aircraft was a single Piaggio P180 operating from EPSC to LIML.
- The number of open sectors in Warszawa FIR was appropriate, and traffic density was at the lower limits.
- The EPSC tower/approach controller held a valid license with ADI endorsement, current medical certification, and had completed a refresher course in January 2015. This was his first duty shift after three days off.
- The EPSC tower controller handed the aircraft to Bremen ACC shortly after takeoff while the aircraft was on a southerly heading.
- ACC sector B controllers, concerned about the heading, warned EPSC tower and Bremen ACC of the danger and suggested a westerly turn.
- Bremen ACC controllers were not informed about the active EP TSA 10A.
- The P180 crew received clearance for a southerly flight path to avoid clouds from Bremen ACC controllers who were unaware of the restricted area.
- The aircraft's turn angle exceeded 45 degrees from the planned track, requiring coordination by Bremen ACC.
- The Letter of Agreement (LoA) with Bremen ACC lacked a map showing TSA 10A and coordination procedures for that area.
Cause
The investigation concluded that the incident was caused by the lack of operational procedures for air traffic control personnel.
Aftermath
As a preventive measure, the Polish Air Navigation Services Agency (PANSA) planned to update the LoA with Bremen ACC to include coordination procedures and a map of TSA 10A within six months, and to introduce provisions in the ACC operations manual for informing adjacent ACCs about the activation of border restricted areas. No safety recommendations were issued.