Casualties unknown

2017-01-27: SAAB, 340 (SP-MRB) — Wrocław (EPWR), PL

Wrocław (EPWR), PL

On January 27, 2017, a SAAB, 340 (registration SP-MRB) was involved in an aviation accident near Wrocław (EPWR), PL. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: Unintentional omission of the inspection step for seat attachment during cabin reconfiguration. This summary draws on records from the Polish State Commission on Aircraft Accidents Investigation (PKBWL).

Sourcesthe Polish State Commission on Aircraft Accidents Investigation (PKBWL)Primary reportUpdated 1785697035Data APIEditorial standards
Aircraft registered SP-MRB
Aircraft registered SP-MRB. Photo: Björn Strey / CC BY-SA 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons

On 27 January 2017, a SAAB SF-340A at Wrocław Airport experienced an incident when a flight attendant discovered an unsecured passenger seat. The crew aborted departure, maintenance secured the seat, and no injuries occurred.

Incident Overview

On 27 January 2017, a SAAB SF-340A aircraft operating from Wrocław Airport (EPWR) experienced an incident during pre-departure procedures. The aircraft, configured as a quick-change variant, had been converted from cargo to passenger configuration prior to the flight. The flight crew consisted of a professional airline pilot as commander.

Course of Events

After engine start and during final cabin checks, a cabin crew member noticed that one passenger seat was not attached to the floor. The commander decided to abort the departure and shut down the engines. Maintenance personnel from the operator's own approved maintenance organization (AMO) were called to the aircraft. This AMO had performed the cabin reconfiguration from cargo to passenger version earlier, following the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) procedure 12-30-25-00. The maintenance team properly secured the seat, after which the aircraft was released for further operation. Subsequent flights reported no anomalies.

Probable Cause

The most probable cause of the incident was an unintentional omission of the inspection step for seat attachment during the cabin reconfiguration process.

Preventive Actions

The operator reported the event to its Safety Management System (SMS) and discussed it at a Safety Action Group (SAG) meeting. System gaps were identified, and corrective/preventive actions were assigned to both the AMO and the Cabin Crew department. The AMO was tasked with developing a task card that includes seat installation verification steps.

Investigation report by the Polish State Commission on Aircraft Accidents Investigation (PKBWL). Original record: https://pkbwl.gov.pl/raporty/2017-0178/. This page is a structured re-presentation; facts and quotes are in the Panstwowa Komisja Badania Wypadkow Lotniczych (PKBWL), Poland.