What happened
On 21 July 2017, an ultralight Pelegrin Tarragon, registration YL-RCT, departed Mielec (EPML) aerodrome for a flight to Kaniów (EPKW). Shortly after takeoff, the aircraft entered a steep climb. At an altitude of approximately 200 m AGL, the aircraft entered a cloud layer, which likely led to a loss of spatial orientation. During a turn within the cloud, the aircraft entered a stall and subsequently entered a left spin.
As the aircraft descended, the pilot attempted to deploy the Magnum 501 Ballistic Recovery System (BRS) at an altitude of approximately 30 m A/GL. Although the rocket engine successfully launched the parachute from its container, the system was not attached to the airframe, preventing the parachute from inflating. The aircraft struck the ground at an angle of approximately 70°, and the wreckage caught fire roughly 16 seconds after impact. The pilot and the passenger were killed in the accident.
The investigation
The PKBWL investigation examined the aircraft's technical condition, weather factors, and flight parameters. Investigators analyzed aerodrome camera footage, which showed the aircraft transitioning from a gentle climb to a mushing condition and a heavy roll. The investigation also focused on the mechanical state of the BRS and the presence of water within the aircraft's control surfaces. Technical inspections revealed that the aircraft's takeoff weight exceeded the maximum takeoff weight (MTOW) by 27.5 kg. Additionally, investigators discovered that water had accumulated inside the elevator due to a lack of drainage holes, a condition that could have affected the aircraft's center of gravity or control movement.
Findings
- The primary cause of the accident was pilot error resulting in a stall during a turn while flying within a cloud.
- The pilot was flying contrary to Visual Flight Rules (VFR) by entering cloud cover.
- The aircraft was operating in an overweight condition, exceeding its MTOW by 27.5 kg.
- The BRS was not attached to the airframe at the time of the emergency.
- The activation of the BRS occurred at an altitude too low (30 m) for effective parachute inflation, as the manual requires at least 80 m.
- Water had accumulated in the horizontal empennage due to the lack of drainage holes in the elevator.
- The pilot likely failed to perform a thorough pre-flight check of the control surfaces.
Safety action
- The manufacturer is recommended to implement drainage holes in the empennage to prevent water accumulation.