Incident Overview
On 12 May 2020, a Cessna 206 aircraft with registration SP-KWK was conducting a flight from Katowice Airport (EPKT) to Bydgoszcz Airport (EPBY). The aircraft was cruising at Flight Level 100 within Class C controlled airspace, which was under the jurisdiction of GAT ACC (General Air Traffic Area Control Centre). However, the flight crew remained in communication with Flight Information Service (FIS) stations rather than air traffic control.
Sequence of Events
During the flight, the Poznań FIS operator informed the crew about the active TRA22 restricted area, specifically noting that segment TRA22A was active from 3,500 ft AMSL to FL 95. After switching to Gdańsk FIS, the crew again received information about TRA22A, but the Gdańsk operator incorrectly stated that the upper limit of the segment was 4,500 ft AMSL instead of FL 95. Relying on this erroneous information, the crew initiated a descent to 5,000 ft AMSL while approaching the area. The crew's decision to descend from FL 100 indicated they believed they were operating in uncontrolled airspace.
At approximately 09:00 UTC, the GAT ACC planning controller noticed a potential conflict and contacted Gdańsk FIS. The Gdańsk FIS operator then instructed the crew to turn left to avoid the restricted area. Despite the turn, the aircraft entered the TRA22A segment airspace.
Airspace Coordination Issues
According to SERA regulations (SERA.6001), the aircraft's flight in controlled airspace required air traffic control service. However, the crew remained in contact with FIS stations, which do not provide such service. No exceptional circumstances justified this arrangement. Additionally, per the SERA Appendix 3 cruising level table, FL 100 is appropriate for IFR flights. The coordination for the aircraft's transit through GAT ACC-controlled airspace was inadequate.
Cause and Contributing Factor
The investigation identified the cause as the transmission of incorrect information regarding the upper altitude limit of the TRA22A segment to the Cessna 206 crew by the FIS Gdańsk operator. A contributing factor was the FIS Gdańsk operator's misreading of the altitude value for the upper limit of the TRA22A segment.
Subsequent Actions
The incident was discussed during a "Safety Day" training session for GAT ACC personnel. No additional safety recommendations were formulated.
*This article is based solely on the factual findings of the official investigation report.*