What happened
On 30 August 2023, an Airbus A321 neo LR, registration EI-LRD, was performing a scheduled commercial flight from Dublin to Washington Dulles Airport. During the final approach to runway 01R under gusty conditions, the aircraft drifted slightly above the glideslope. The Pilot Flying, attempting to correct this deviation, applied nose-down inputs which, combined with a reduction in headwind, led to a high rate of descent near the ground.
As the aircraft neared the runway, a rapid aft side stick input was made to arrest the descent, causing the aircraft to bounce to a height of approximately 3 feet. During this bounce, further nose-up inputs were applied, causing the aircraft to pitch up beyond its structural limits. The aircraft touched down a second time, resulting in a tailstrike that caused substantial damage to the aft fuselage. The Commander immediately took control and initiated a go-around. The aircraft subsequently completed a second, uneventful approach and landed safely. Two cabin crew members sustained minor injuries during the sequence.
The investigation
The AAIU examined the flight data and cockpit voice recordings to reconstruct the landing sequence. The investigation looked into the flight crew's inputs, the aircraft's automated systems, and the environmental conditions at the time of the accident. Investigators also reviewed the crew's awareness of the event and the availability of relevant emergency procedures.
Findings
- The approach was conducted in gusty winds, which contributed to the initial glideslope deviation.
- The aircraft experienced a high rate of descent (976 fpm) shortly before touchdown due to corrective nose-down inputs.
- A tailstrike occurred because the pitch attitude exceeded the aircraft's limit during the second touchdown following a bounce.
- The flight crew was unaware that a tailstrike had occurred, as there is no automated ECAM warning for such an event, and the 'Pitch Pitch' warning was not audible to the crew during the critical phase.
- The Commander's ability to monitor the Pilot Flying's inputs was limited because the side sticks are not mechanically linked.
- The crew did not perform the tailstrike checklist because they were not aware of the impact until informed by ground engineers.