History of Flight
On May 10, 2025, at about 0935 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA-32RT-300 airplane, N30689, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Yulee, Florida. The private pilot sustained fatal injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.
The pilot’s spouse reported that the purpose of the flight was to reposition the airplane from Nassau Airport (83FL), Yulee, Florida, to Fernandina Beach Municipal Airport (FHB), Fernandina Beach, Florida, where they would wait for approaching thunderstorms before continuing to Tennessee. The straight-line distance between 83FL and FHB was 3.9 nautical miles.
Review of video captured by a motion-activated surveillance camera mounted on a hangar near the end of runway 12 at 83FL showed the airplane taxiing toward runway 12 and beginning a back-taxi down the runway. During the taxi, the airplane’s nose baggage door appeared closed. As the video continued, the airplane re-entered the frame on a takeoff roll about 0934. The video showed that, during the takeoff, the nose baggage door was open. The door stayed open while the airplane became airborne and exited the video frame.
Following the accident, a sweep of the usable portion of runway 12 found a case of aviation oil about 100 feet from the beginning of the runway and to the right of the centerline. A bag of dog food was also found about 440 feet from the beginning of the runway and to the right of the centerline.
Review of surveillance video showed the airplane in a nose-high angle of attack just after lifting off. One eyewitness reported that the wings rocked back and forth before the left wing dropped and the airplane descended behind trees. Another witness and surveillance videos showed the airplane enter a steep left-wing-low descent just before impacting a tree and the ground about 10 seconds after departing 83FL.
Personnel Information
The private pilot held an instrument rating. A review of the pilot’s logbook found that the last logged flight was on August 27, 2023, after which he received a logbook entry stating he had satisfactorily completed the flight review required by 14 CFR Part 61.56. At the time of the flight review, the pilot had a total flight time of 365.6 hours, with 17.2 hours in the make and model of the accident airplane. The pilot’s flight currency could not be determined based upon the available information.
Aircraft Information
The pilot’s spouse reported that, several weeks before the accident, she and the pilot had flown from Clearwater Air Park (CLW), Clearwater, Florida, to 83FL, a flight of about 1 hour. She reported that they had fully fueled the airplane before that flight and that the accident flight was the first flight since fueling. She also indicated that 83FL did not have fuel services and they did not add any fuel after the flight from CLW to 83FL. The Piper PA-32RT-300 Pilot Operating Handbook showed the airplane had an endurance between 5 and 7 hours depending on the power setting used.
An estimated weight and balance was performed. A weight of 40 lbs was placed in the forward baggage compartment to account for the case of aviation oil and bag of dog food found on the runway, which likely exited the forward baggage compartment. Additionally, 100 lbs was placed in the aft baggage compartment because baggage was located there but sustained thermal damage; 100 lbs is the maximum for the aft baggage compartment. Another 100 lbs was placed in the second and third seating rows to account for baggage, “E-bikes,” and more dog food found in that area. Actual baggage weights could not be determined due to the postimpact fire. The calculation included 78 gallons of fuel based on the spouse’s report. The resulting weight and balance was within the airplane's flight envelope. The weight and balance was then recalculated with the 40 lbs removed to simulate the baggage falling out of the open nose baggage compartment. The resulting weight and balance remained within the flight envelope.
The manufacturer did not have test data available regarding controllability with the nose baggage door open, but reports from pilots who experienced a nose baggage door opening in flight in this make and model did not reveal flight controllability issues.
Meteorological Information
A regional view of the National Weather Service National Reflectivity Mosaic for 0935 showed echoes of 25 to 55 dBZ near the accident site. The closest NWS WSR-88D radar, from Jacksonville, Florida, located 12 miles southwest of the accident site, depicted portions of reflectivity values between 30 and 45 dBZ (moderate to heavy intensity echoes) near the accident site at the accident time, moving from west to east.
There was a Convective Significant Meteorological Information (SIGMET) advisory valid for the accident site at the accident time, issued by the Aviation Weather Center. SIGMET 42E, issued about 0855, valid through 1055, forecast an area of embedded thunderstorms with tops above flight level 450, with the SIGMET box area moving from 260° at 25 knots.
A weather station at FHB, located about 3 nautical miles east of the accident site, reported about 0935 wind from 180° true at 5 knots, 10 statute miles visibility, scattered clouds at 2,300 feet agl, with thunderstorms in the vicinity and lightning distant southwest through north. The same station reported at 0955 wind from 320° at 13 knots gusting to 20 knots, 2 statute miles visibility in heavy rain and thunderstorms, overcast clouds at 2,100 feet agl, and lightning in all quadrants.
Multiple witnesses reported that it had just begun to rain about the time of the accident. A review of surveillance video showed drops of water consistent with rain on the camera lens at the time of the accident.
Wreckage and Impact Information
The wreckage was examined at the accident site. The initial impact point was identified as a broken branch about 40 feet up a tree. A crater in the ground was identified about 24 feet from the tree, and the wreckage came to rest upright about 15 feet from the crater, on a magnetic heading of 264°. The calculated angle of descent between the initial tree impact and the crater was about 50°. An 84-inch-long outboard portion of the left wing was impact-separated with the left aileron attached and remained near the crater.
The cockpit and majority of the fuselage were consumed by postimpact fire. The left flap, right wing, rudder, vertical stabilizer, and a majority of the stabilator and stabilator trim were also consumed by the postimpact fire. Aileron flight control continuity was confirmed from the aileron bellcranks to the flight control attachment points in the cockpit. Rudder flight control continuity was confirmed from the rudder control drum to the rudder pedals. Stabilator control continuity was confirmed from the stabilator control bellcrank to the lower portion of the cockpit control. The stabilator trim actuator was measured and equated to a trim setting halfway between full nose down and neutral. The nose baggage door was not located in the wreckage; its location was consumed by the postimpact fire.
The three-blade propeller remained attached to the engine crankshaft flange. The propeller blades exhibited aft bending and chordwise scratching. Engine crankshaft and valvetrain continuity were established when the propeller was rotated 720°. Thumb suction and compression were observed on all cylinders. The vacuum pump remained attached to the engine accessory case; the drive gear and carbon veins all remained intact. The left impulse coupled magneto and right electronic magneto were removed and exhibited thermal damage. The fuel pump exhibited impact and thermal damage. The fuel injector assembly was impact-separated and exhibited thermal damage. The sparkplugs were removed and exhibited normal wear and coloration consistent with normal engine operation when compared to the Champion Aviation Check-A-Plug AV-27 chart. The fuel injector nozzles were removed and were free of debris.
The postimpact fire consumed most of the airplane’s fuel system. Both main wing fuel tanks were breached and exhibited thermal damage.
Additional Information
The Airplane Flying Handbook (FAA-H-8083-3C) discusses door openings in flight, stating that an inadvertent door opening is usually not of great concern to flight safety, but the pilot's reaction at the moment can be critical. It advises pilots to concentrate on flying the airplane, not rush to land, and not attempt to reach the door.
The Pilot’s Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge (FAA-H-8083-25C) discusses external pressures such as “get-there-itis,” which can impair pilot judgment through fixation on the original goal.
Medical and Pathological Information
The Florida District 4 Medical Examiner ruled the cause of death for the pilot as blunt impact trauma and the manner of death as accident. The FAA Forensic Sciences Laboratory performed toxicological testing of postmortem specimens. Atorvastatin was detected in the liver and blood; Atorvastatin (Lipitor) is a statin used for high cholesterol and is acceptable for pilots. No other tested-for substances were detected.