Accident Overview
On December 18, 2025, at 1015 eastern standard time, a Cessna Citation 550, registration N257BW, was destroyed when it crashed near Statesville, North Carolina. The pilot and six passengers sustained fatal injuries. The airplane was being operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.
Preflight and Departure
The airplane was positioned on the south parking ramp at Statesville Regional Airport (SVH) for passenger loading and preflight. Ground personnel reported that the aircraft was fully fueled prior to the flight. The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) began capturing audio at 0944:21. The recording confirmed that the airline transport rated pilot occupied the left seat; his adult son, a private pilot with single-engine land and instrument ratings, was in the right seat; and a rear-seat passenger, also a private pilot with multi-engine, instrument, and helicopter ratings, was seated near the cockpit in the cabin area.
Engine start was initiated using onboard battery power. After an initial unsuccessful start of the left (No. 1) engine, both engines were started at about 0953. The airplane taxied from the south parking area at 0959, crossed runway 10/28 at midfield, and proceeded to the approach end of runway 10. During taxi, the pilot and the two pilot-rated passengers discussed that a thrust reverser indicator light for an unspecified engine was inoperative, but that the affected thrust reverser was working properly.
Takeoff and Initial Climb
The airplane departed runway 10 at SVH under visual flight rules (VFR) at about 1006. The pilot intended to activate an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan once airborne, with a planned destination of Sarasota/Bradenton International Airport (SRQ), Sarasota, Florida. The pilot performed the takeoff and departure while the right-seat passenger completed checklists and handled radio communications. During the takeoff roll, the rear passenger commented that the left engine was producing more power than the right and suggested a faulty gauge. The pilot continued the takeoff.
Preliminary GPS data indicated that the airplane made a climbing left turn after takeoff. At 1007:19, the pilot stated he would remain VFR until they received IFR clearance. By 1008, the airplane had turned about 180° and reached an altitude of about 2,200 ft mean sea level (msl). The airplane then continued turning left and began to descend. The right-seat passenger attempted to contact ZTL ATC three times between 1008 and 1010 to activate the IFR flight plan but was unsuccessful due to controller workload and radio congestion.
In-Flight Anomalies
Around 1009, the pilot and rear passenger discussed climbing to a higher altitude despite the VFR requirement. The airplane had descended to about 1,580 ft msl, on a heading of about 250° at 164 knots indicated airspeed (IAS). The pilot initiated a climb, and shortly after, the rear passenger noted a difference between the left and right engine interstage turbine temperature (ITT) indications. No further discussion of engine instruments occurred for the remainder of the CVR recording. The autopilot was disengaged, either intentionally or independently, at 1010:02.
Beginning at 1010:14, no intelligible audio was captured from the left-seat hot microphone and audio panel for 3 minutes and 55 seconds. Starting at 1010:18, the cockpit area microphone recorded the pilot remarking that his attitude indicator was not working properly and that additional left-side flight instruments might also be malfunctioning. The Garmin GTN-750 stopped recording airspeed data at 1009:37 and heading data at 1010:58.
About 1011, control of the airplane was transferred to the right-seat passenger at an altitude of about 4,500 ft msl. No comments indicated any malfunctions with the right-side cockpit instruments. At 1011:04, severe degradation in CVR audio quality occurred across all channels, lasting 3 minutes and 5 seconds.
Descent and Approach
Around 1013, at about 1,870 ft msl, the pilot and both pilot-rated passengers stated they could see the ground. Although no positive transfer of control was recorded, subsequent communication suggested the pilot had resumed control. The pilot requested flaps extension at 1013:03, made a right turn to a westerly heading, and requested landing gear extension at 1013:22. Discussions indicated the landing gear was configured, but gear indicator lights were not illuminated.
At 1013:48, the right-seat passenger transmitted on the SVH common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF): "…we're having some issues here." At 1014:05, the rear passenger asked about power to the "alternator" (note: the CE-550 is not equipped with an alternator). About four seconds later, audio quality returned to previous levels. The pilot then commented that was the "problem," without specifying what the problem was or what corrective actions were taken. No further discussion of flight instrumentation occurred on the CVR.
Final Approach and Impact
The airplane began a left turn (consistent with a base leg) toward runway 28 at about 1014:10, at 1,325 ft altitude and 142 kts groundspeed. The Garmin GTN-750 resumed recording airspeed data at 1014:12. GPS data showed the airplane rolled out onto runway heading at about 1014:50, at 1,240 ft msl and 114 kts IAS. The right-seat passenger visually acquired the runway and provided directional guidance. Around 1015:00, the pilot indicated he had acquired the runway visually.
Recorded GTN-750 data showed decreasing airspeed and altitude from alignment on final approach until 1015:18, when the airplane was at 984 ft msl and 99 kts IAS. The airplane continued descending to 942 ft msl until CVR audio and GPS data ended at 1015:23. IAS fluctuated between 107 and 93 kts during the final five seconds.
Wreckage and Site Examination
The first identified point of impact (FIPI) was the easternmost light station of the runway 28 Medium Intensity Approach Light System with Runway Alignment Indicator Lights (MALSR), located about 1,380 ft from the runway threshold. Two lightbulbs, approximately 6 ft apart, were separated from the otherwise intact 29-ft-tall light station. The upper portion of a second MALSR light station, about 180 ft from the FIPI, was separated, leaving about 15 ft of frangible pole standing. A group of damaged trees about 235 ft from the FIPI were sheared about 12 ft above ground level. Blackened branches and grass marked the first indication of fire near the west side of the trees.
A ground impression was observed about 350 ft from the FIPI, near the airport perimeter fence, extending through the MALSR decision light station. The debris path continued west through the runway overrun to where the main wreckage came to rest on the runway blast area, about 400 ft short of the runway 28 threshold, oriented eastward. Heavy ground charring began near the decision light station and continued along the debris field to the wreckage.
A post-impact fire consumed most of the fuselage and heat-damaged both wings, empennage, and both engines. All flight control surfaces were identified in the debris path and main wreckage. No evidence of pre-impact separation of any component or structure was found.
Engines Examination
Both engines remained attached to their pylon structures, with thrust reversers found in the stowed position. There was no evidence of uncontained engine failure. The cockpit throttle quadrant had both thrust levers full forward and both reverse levers stowed. The No. 1 engine's stage 2 low-pressure turbine (LPT) blades appeared undamaged; fan blades exhibited varying damage with missing material at tips, and inlet surfaces showed circumferential scoring. The No. 2 engine's LPT blades appeared undamaged; most of the inlet was not attached, and fan blades exhibited similar damage.
Pilot Experience
The pilot held type ratings for A-320, A-330, A-350, B-737, B-757, B-767, CE-500, and DC-10. His CE-500 type rating carried the limitation "CE-500 Second in Command Required." He reported 17,000 total flight hours and 400 hours in the last six months as of his last first-class medical application on April 29, 2025.
The right-seat passenger's logbook showed 175.3 total hours in single-engine land airplanes as of November 29, 2025. His most recent first-class medical certificate was issued August 12, 2024. He was not qualified to perform second-in-command duties per 14 CFR part 61.55.
The rear passenger reported 3,500 total hours and 65 hours in the last six months as of his last medical application on February 21, 2025. He held a second-class medical certificate without limitation.
Weather Conditions
The SVH Automated Weather Observing System (AWOS), recorded on the CVR, reported at 0945: wind calm, visibility 10 statute miles, ceiling 3,900 ft broken, 4,800 ft overcast, temperature 7°C, dewpoint -0°C, altimeter 30.19 inHg. At 0954: wind from 050° at 3 knots, visibility 10, 3,900 ft scattered, ceiling 5,000 ft overcast, temperature 7°C, dewpoint 0°C, altimeter 30.19 inHg.
The 1015 METAR for SVH reported: wind calm, visibility 5 statute miles, heavy drizzle, ceiling broken at 1,200 ft agl, broken at 2,200 ft agl, overcast at 5,000 ft agl, temperature 7°C, dewpoint 1°C, altimeter 30.19 inHg; remarks included a precipitation discriminator.
Recorders
The aircraft was equipped with a Fairchild GA-100 tape-based CVR, recovered by NTSB personnel. The recording contained approximately 31 minutes of analog audio on a continuous loop tape in four-channel format. Audio quality was poor with low signal-to-noise ratio; extraordinary means were required to make portions intelligible.
The airplane was not equipped with, and was not required to have, a flight data recorder.
A Garmin GTN-750 was recovered; this combined GPS/navigation/radio/multi-function display recorded about 20 parameters for the entire accident flight in non-volatile memory.