Incident Summary
On a scheduled flight from Edmonton International Airport to Peace River, Alberta, Air Canada Regional Flight CDR8321, a de Havilland DHC-8-100 (registration C-FDND), landed on a snow-covered grassy area beside Runway 22. The aircraft carried 3 crew members and 8 passengers. There was no damage to the aircraft and no injuries.
Sequence of Events
The flight departed Edmonton at 0800 mountain daylight time on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. The first officer was the pilot flying. At 0840, the Peace River Flight Service Station (FSS) specialist provided the latest weather: winds calm; visibility 15 statute miles; clouds broken at 400 feet above ground level (agl) and overcast at 800 feet agl; temperature minus 4°C; dew point minus 5°C; altimeter 29.87 inches of mercury. The runway was reported as 100% snow covered to a depth of ¼-inch and had been sanded. The Canadian runway friction index (CRFI) was 0.37.
The crew conducted a VOR/DME approach to Runway 22. With the autopilot engaged, the aircraft intercepted the final approach course. Just after crossing the XEVER final approach fix, both pilots sighted what they believed to be the runway. The first officer disengaged the autopilot and descended to the minimum descent altitude. At about one mile from the runway, the first officer saw the PAPI lights showing red over red. The aircraft intercepted the PAPI glide path and followed it toward the runway. At 0906, the aircraft touched down on a snow-covered grassy area 151 feet to the right of the runway and 1900 feet beyond the runway threshold.
The FSS specialist noticed the aircraft landing beside the runway and instructed a go-around. The crew initiated a go-around, and the aircraft became airborne after traveling 1300 feet along the ground. The crew requested another approach to Runway 22 but did not land because they did not see the runway environment in time for a stabilized approach. The flight subsequently diverted to Edmonton, where it landed safely.
Findings
The flight crew's communications after the go-around indicated they thought they had landed on Runway 22. Their actions were consistent with perceptual confusion, where an object is mistaken for the intended object because it looks similar and is in the expected location. The grassy area was rectangular, similar in size and orientation to the runway, and snow-covered with protruding brown grass and tire tracks. The runway was also snow-covered, and runway markings were not visible. The lateral displacement was insufficient to cause noticeable VOR needle deflection, and the PAPI lights were not displaced enough to be noted. The approach and runway lights were hard to see due to intensity, time of day, and snow-covered background. The runway was not equipped with runway identification lights (RILS) or omni-directional approach lighting systems (ODALS).
The airport maintainer did not sweep Runway 22 prior to the flight because he was concerned it would make the runway more slippery and was not aware of the requirement to provide visual contrast. His lack of training on the airport operations manual (AOM) likely contributed to this lack of awareness. Transport Canada's proposed standards for airport winter maintenance do not address maintaining visual contrast to delineate the runway from surrounding terrain.