Overview
On a visual flight rules flight from Iyachisakus Lake, Quebec, to an outfitter on Mollet Lake, a de Havilland DHC-2 Mk 1 Beaver (registration C-GPUO, serial number 810) stalled at low altitude and crashed. The aircraft was found partly submerged near the north shore of Mollet Lake, with the nose in the water and leaning backward. Four injured occupants were rescued; the pilot and two passengers sustained fatal injuries.
Aircraft and Pilot Information
The aircraft was certified, equipped, and maintained in accordance with existing regulations. Weight and balance were within prescribed limits. No stall warning device was installed, nor was one required at certification. The pilot held a commercial pilot licence and a float endorsement, had a Group 1 instrument flight rating, and had completed annual training on the DHC-2. His most recent medical examination indicated 900 total flying hours. The pilot had not taken decision-making refresher training since 1995, as required every three years under Canadian Aviation Regulations.
Weather Conditions
A low-pressure system was present, with variable cloud height and visibility fluctuating in snow showers. Winds were from the southwest at 20 to 25 knots, temperature around 1°C, and visibility at times reduced to one-half mile. A Cessna 185 was forced to land due to weather earlier. However, when the Beaver overflew that Cessna at about 1720, visual flight rules conditions prevailed. The Beaver pilot reported visual conditions 3 nautical miles from destination. Witnesses at the outfitter reported heavy snow at the time of the accident.
Accident Sequence
The investigation found no indication of an emergency before impact. The vacuum pump had failed before the crash, but the exact time was unknown; the affected instruments were not required for visual flight rules. Propeller blades were in fine pitch and flaps extended 30 degrees, suggesting the pilot had completed landing checks. For unknown reasons, the pilot turned right away from the intended landing area rather than the typical left turn onto final approach. This right turn placed the aircraft on a downwind track at low altitude, conducive to illusions created by drift. Conditions were also conducive to contamination of flight surfaces (icing was reported by other aircraft). The combined effect of contamination and the turn increased stall speed.
Findings
The Transportation Safety Board found that the seaplane stalled at an altitude that did not allow the pilot time to recover, and the stall occurred in circumstances conducive to illusions created by drift. Additional risks identified included the absence of a stall warning device, front seat occupants not wearing shoulder harnesses, passengers not using available life jackets, and the emergency locator transmitter failing to emit a distress signal due to a short circuit.