Accident Summary
On a scheduled courier flight from Moncton, New Brunswick, to Halifax, Nova Scotia, a PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain (registration C-GYYJ, serial number 31-7652086) landed with the landing gear retracted after completing an instrument landing system (ILS) approach to Runway 15 at Halifax. Neither of the two crew members nor the company passenger was injured. The aircraft sustained damage to its engines, propellers, and fuselage. The accident occurred at night at 2042 Atlantic daylight time.
Aircraft and Crew
The captain held an airline transport pilot licence with a Group 1 instrument rating and had approximately 2800 hours total time, with about 1200 hours on the PA-31. The first officer held a commercial pilot licence with a Group 1 instrument rating and had approximately 1050 hours total time, with approximately 600 hours on the PA-31.
Flight Details
The flight was the final leg of a regularly scheduled cargo/courier route. The aircraft departed Halifax at 0551, proceeded uneventfully on the outbound route, and arrived in Charlo at 0803. Both crew rested for about eight hours. They departed Charlo at 1745 on the reverse routing. There was moderate mechanical turbulence, and ceilings and visibilities were at or near minimums on all approaches. During the ILS approach into Moncton, the first officer had difficulty seeing the horizontal situation indicator (HSI) because of darkness. In Moncton, a company passenger boarded, and the aircraft departed at 2002 with the first officer flying.
Approach and Landing
The wind at Halifax was from 040° magnetic at 16 gusting to 24 knots, with a ceiling of 200 feet. The aircraft was vectored for a straight-in ILS approach to Runway 15. The crew briefed the approach, and the first officer continued flying. The HSI lighting had failed, and the crew used a flashlight to illuminate the instrument. On initial interception of the glideslope, the captain called "glideslope alive" and then diverted the flashlight to refer to the approach chart, leaving the HSI in darkness. The first officer missed the "Dot Above" call, which prompts the landing gear to be lowered. At 100 feet above decision height, the captain called the runway lights in sight and took control due to water on the windscreen. The aircraft touched down smoothly with some engine power on, and the gear was retracted. After stopping, the crew realized the landing gear was not extended. The captain noted the gear handle was up and the landing light switch was off.
Post-Accident Findings
Post-accident inspection revealed that the landing gear functioned normally. The landing gear warning horn also operated normally. The HSI interior lights and the VOR/LOC/Glideslope indicator were defective. Two post lights were missing from the instrument panel. The operator's standard operating procedures (SOPs) for the PA-31 did not include a final landing gear check. The known lighting defects had not been recorded in the journey logbook as required by the operator's Maintenance Control and Policy Manual.
Causes and Contributing Factors
The investigation found that known instrument lighting defects were not recorded, rectified, or deferred; the "Dot Above" call was missed when the flashlight beam was redirected; the crew did not complete a before-landing check; and the crew did not detect that the landing gear was up because of high workload, the landing gear warning horn not sounding, and increased drag from the high flap setting.