Casualties unknown

2002-01-08: Pacific Coastal Airlines — Between — Shorts SD-3-60 C-GPCJ (PCO909), CA

Shorts SD-3-60 C-GPCJ (PCO909), CA

On January 8, 2002, a Pacific Coastal Airlines operated by Between was involved in an aviation accident near Shorts SD-3-60 C-GPCJ (PCO909), CA. This summary draws on records from the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB); 8 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

Sourcesthe Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB)Primary reportUpdated 1785068748Data APIEditorial standards

At about 0831 PST, a Shorts SD-3-60 (C-GPCJ) operated by Pacific Coastal Airlines as PCO909 and a Beechcraft 1900D (C-FCMR) operated by Central Mountain Air as GLR689 experienced a conflict near Campbell River, British Columbia. PCO909, operating under VFR, aborted its visual approach due to weather below VFR minima, while GLR689, on an IFR approach, received a TCAS resolution advisory and executed evasive maneuvers. Both aircraft subsequently landed safely.

Incident Overview

On a scheduled flight from Vancouver to Campbell River, British Columbia, two aircraft experienced a conflict near the Campbell River airport. The Shorts SD-3-60, registration C-GPCJ, operated by Pacific Coastal Airlines as flight PCO909, was conducting the flight under visual flight rules (VFR). The Beechcraft 1900D, registration C-FCMR, operated by Central Mountain Air as flight GLR689, was operating under instrument flight rules (IFR). Both flights departed Vancouver; PCO909 from Runway 30 and GLR689 from Runway 08R.

Weather Conditions

At 0800 local time, the Campbell River Flight Service Station (FSS) issued a regular weather observation: scattered cloud at 900 feet above ground level (agl), broken cloud at 5500 feet agl, and visibility 10 miles. The weather was changeable, and the FSS was in the process of taking a special observation at the time of the incident. A special weather report issued at 0835 indicated that the lower cloud layer had reduced to 800 feet and its coverage increased from scattered to broken, resulting in a ceiling of 800 feet. This was below VFR minima (ceiling 1000 feet, visibility 3 miles) for the Class E control zone.

Flight Paths and Communications

PCO909 reported on a right base leg for Runway 29 but, upon reaching the shoreline, encountered weather conditions below VFR limits. The crew aborted the visual approach by turning left and climbing to the east. GLR689 had been cleared by the Comox terminal controller for a straight-in LOC(BC)/DME approach to Runway 29. At 0829, GLR689 contacted the Campbell River FSS on the mandatory frequency (MF) and twice requested confirmation of the cloud ceiling. The FSS provided the 0800 report and noted that the laser ceilometer showed lower cloud at 700 and 800 feet agl.

At 0830, PCO909 reported to the FSS that it was passing Oyster River, about 7 nm southeast of the airport, and stated an intention for a right base for Runway 29. However, the actual flight path was not consistent with this procedure.

Conflict and Resolution

As PCO909 climbed to the east, GLR689 received a resolution advisory (RA) from its traffic alert and collision avoidance system (TCAS). The crew executed a missed approach with an avoidance maneuver to the left of track. Both aircraft were in each other's proximity as they climbed in opposite directions. Following the event, each flight crew contacted Comox for radar vectors to IFR approaches and landed at Campbell River without further incident.

Regulatory Context

PCO909 was operating under Canadian Aviation Regulation (CAR) Part 705, while GLR689 operated under CAR Part 704. CARs do not limit air carriers to IFR flight only; VFR operations can provide time and cost savings. However, VFR flight bypasses certain safety defenses in the air traffic management system, such as radar identification and positive separation. The TCAS on GLR689 provided an additional defense; PCO909 was not equipped with TCAS.

Communication and Procedural Issues

Canadian Aviation Regulation 602.101 requires VFR flights to provide position, altitude, ETA, and arrival procedure intentions at least five minutes before entering a mandatory frequency area. PCO909's initial MF report did not include an altitude or ETA, and the route flown did not match the reported arrival procedure. The FSS did not advise PCO909 of the deteriorating weather, as the special observation was not yet issued. The TSB investigation noted that ineffective communications and non-adherence to published circuit procedures have contributed to mid-air collisions.

Abort Decision

When PCO909's crew encountered weather below VFR minima, they had three abort options: continue straight, turn right, or turn left. Continuing straight or turning right would have led into poor weather, while a left turn briefly directed the aircraft toward the other traffic. The pilot determined a left turn presented the lowest risk. This decision triggered the TCAS RA on GLR689.