Casualties unknown

2002-11-12: Cessna Citation 550 C-GYCJ — Canada Jet Charters Limited — Sandspit Airport, British Columbia, CA

Sandspit Airport, British Columbia, CA

On November 12, 2002, a Cessna Citation 550 C-GYCJ operated by Canada Jet Charters Limited was involved in an aviation accident near Sandspit Airport, British Columbia, CA. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The crew did not complete the before-landing checks, ignored aural warnings, and did not lower the landing gear, which resulted in a gear-up landing. This summary draws on records from the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB); 1 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

Sourcesthe Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB)Primary reportUpdated 1785068748Data APIEditorial standards

A Cessna Citation 550 conducting a medevac flight landed with its landing gear retracted after the crew failed to lower the gear and ignored aural warnings, resulting in substantial damage but no injuries.

Accident Overview

On the evening of an unspecified date, a Cessna Citation 550, registration C-GYCJ, operated by Canada Jet Charters Ltd., departed Vancouver International Airport, British Columbia, on a medical evacuation flight to Sandspit Airport in the Queen Charlotte Islands. The aircraft carried two pilots and two Advanced Life Support Paramedics. No injuries were reported, but the aircraft sustained substantial structural damage.

Crew Information

The captain, occupying the right seat as the non-flying pilot, had approximately 4550 total flight hours, including 1450 hours on the Cessna Citation 550. He held an airline transport pilot licence with type and instrument ratings and had been off duty for 24 hours before the flight.

The first officer, occupying the left seat as the flying pilot, had approximately 3300 total flight hours, including 850 hours on the Cessna Citation 550. He also held an airline transport pilot licence with type and instrument ratings and had been off duty for 12 hours before the flight.

Flight Details

The pilots checked in at the company facility at 1830 Pacific standard time. After reviewing weather information, they deemed conditions suitable for instrument flight rules. The aircraft departed at 1918 with the first officer as the flying pilot. The flight was routine until 2021 when the crew obtained the Sandspit weather observation from the automated system: wind from 220 degrees magnetic at 30 knots, gusting to 37 knots. The crew briefed for a VOR/DME approach to Runway 30 and decided to land with flaps at the approach position (15°) instead of full flaps due to the strong, gusting crosswind.

During the descent, the landing gear warning horn sounded four times before the aircraft passed the final approach fix (FAF). The crew silenced it each time. After the FAF, the horn sounded three more times but was again silenced. The first officer did not call for gear extension or the before-landing checklist; the captain did not remind him.

Landing and Aftermath

At 2051, about two nautical miles from the runway, the captain noted the precision approach path indicator (PAPI) was not visible and attempted to activate it remotely. This led to a radio exchange with Terrace Flight Service Station regarding runway lighting. After initial runway contact, the aircraft bounced several times, veered right, breaking five runway lights, then veered left and stopped approximately 500 feet from the runway end on a heading of about 280 degrees magnetic. The crew evacuated and later discovered the landing gear was in the up position.

Investigation Findings

The Transportation Safety Board of Canada determined the cause: the crew did not complete the before-landing checks, ignored aural warnings, and did not lower the landing gear, resulting in a gear-up landing. The investigation noted that the landing gear warning system on the Cessna Citation 550 could be silenced when flaps were at the approach position. The aircraft was not equipped with a ground proximity warning system (GPWS), which was not required under regulations but could have provided a warning. The before-landing checklist used by the company did not match the Aircraft Flight Manual requirement to retract speed brakes prior to 50 feet.

As a result of the investigation, the BC Ambulance Service required GPWS installation on contracted aircraft. Transport Canada proposed amendments to regulations regarding Terrain Avoidance Warning Systems (TAWS), though aircraft configured like the occurrence would not be required to be equipped.

Probable cause

The crew did not complete the before-landing checks, ignored aural warnings, and did not lower the landing gear, which resulted in a gear-up landing.