Casualties unknown

2003-01-29: Beech 99 C-GHVI — Bearskin Lake Air Service — Pikangikum, Ontario 2 nm NW, CA

Pikangikum, Ontario 2 nm NW, CA

On January 29, 2003, a Beech 99 C-GHVI operated by Bearskin Lake Air Service was involved in an aviation accident near Pikangikum, Ontario 2 nm NW, CA. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The captain chose to fly from the right seat without being current for right-seat operation and did not set the instrument lighting correctly, preventing effective use of the artificial horizon and leading to loss of situational awareness and control. This summary draws on records from the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB).

Sourcesthe Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB)Primary reportUpdated 1785068748Data APIEditorial standards

Bearskin Flight 359, a Beech 99, struck a frozen lake after takeoff from Pikangikum, Ontario, at night. The captain, flying from the right seat without required training, could not see the artificial horizon due to dim instrument lighting, leading to loss of control. No injuries.

Accident Sequence

Bearskin Flight 359, a Beech 99 (registration C-GHVI), departed Pikangikum, Ontario, at 1838 central standard time on a night visual flight rules flight to Poplar Hill. The aircraft carried two pilots and three passengers. The captain, serving as pilot flying (PF), occupied the right-hand seat. After a normal takeoff from Runway 27, the aircraft climbed over a lake. At approximately 400 feet above ground level, the PF initiated a climbing right turn. During the turn, the PF had difficulty reading the artificial horizon and focused on the bank angle. The first officer (FO) alerted the PF that the aircraft was descending at 2,000 feet per minute and took control. The aircraft struck the frozen lake surface, bounced, and became airborne again. The FO retained control, while the captain attempted to feather the damaged right propeller. The FO then force-landed the aircraft on the lake. The aircraft sustained substantial damage; no one was injured.

Crew Background and Configuration

Earlier, the original FO became ill, and a relief pilot was assigned as captain based on seniority. The original captain became the FO. The cockpit was initially configured for left-seat operation. The new captain chose to fly from the right seat for convenience. According to company operations manual, a left-seat qualified pilot who receives annual right-seat training may operate from the right seat. However, the captain had not received right-seat training as a captain. Both pilots held valid airline transport pilot licenses and current proficiency checks. The captain had about 4,800 flight hours, with two years as a Beech 99 captain; the FO had about 4,200 hours, also with two years as captain.

Lighting and Visibility

During the flight to Pikangikum, the FO adjusted the cockpit instrument lighting. The captain, finding the lighting too bright, re-adjusted the right-side lighting to a lower setting. After landing at Pikangikum, the crew worked on a brightly lit ramp and loaded three passengers. The PF did not adjust the lighting again. After takeoff, the PF found the artificial horizon too dim to read, even leaning forward to see it. The aircraft climbed over a dark lake with no ground lights or moonlight. The moon was in its last waning phase, making the night very dark. The PF concentrated on the bank angle without cross-checking other instruments, leading to an unnoticed high sink rate. The weather was similar to Red Lake's: wind 210° at 15 gusting 25 knots, visibility 12 statute miles in light snow and drifting snow, ceiling 2,500 feet broken, temperature -15°C.

Investigation Findings

The investigation found that the captain chose to fly from the right seat during a night departure when not current to operate from that seat. The captain did not set the instrument lighting correctly for the night takeoff and was unable to use the artificial horizon effectively, resulting in loss of situational awareness and subsequent loss of control. Although the flight was filed as VFR, the lack of outside visual references effectively placed it in instrument flight conditions. The aircraft's flaps were found in the takeoff position, though there was indication they had been selected up on takeoff. No pre-impact anomalies were found in the airframe, flight controls, or engines. The aircraft's weight and balance were within limits.

Probable cause

The captain chose to fly from the right seat without being current for right-seat operation and did not set the instrument lighting correctly, preventing effective use of the artificial horizon and leading to loss of situational awareness and control.