Synopsis
On a visual flight rules flight from Îles-de-la-Madeleine, Quebec to Gaspé, Quebec, a Piper PA-31-310 (registration C-FARL, serial number 31306) operated by Les Ailes de Gaspé inc. was destroyed when it struck a hilltop 1.2 nautical miles northeast of Gaspé Airport. The three occupants—one pilot and two passengers—were fatally injured. The aircraft did not catch fire.
Flight History
Before departing Gaspé at approximately 1612 eastern daylight time, the pilot visited the NAV CANADA website for a weather report. The terminal aerodrome forecast (TAF) for Gaspé, issued at 1930 UTC, indicated scattered cloud at 800 feet above ground level (agl), ceiling at 3000 feet agl, visibility over 6 miles; temporarily between 0000 and 0800 UTC, ceiling 800 feet agl. The graphic area forecast (GFA) valid from 1800 UTC indicated possibility of ceiling at 200 feet agl and fog patches reducing visibility to ½ mile along the Gulf of St. Lawrence shores.
The pilot arrived at Gaspé airport around 1645, appearing in good condition and ready for the flight. He filed a VFR flight plan for the return trip. The aircraft's four fuel tanks were filled. The aircraft took off at approximately 1705 with an anticipated return time of approximately 1845. The flight to Îles-de-la-Madeleine was without incident, landing at approximately 1800. Twelve minutes later, with two passengers on board, the aircraft departed for Gaspé.
Weather and Communications
While en route, the TAF for Gaspé was revised twice (at 1839 and 1849 UTC), indicating deteriorating conditions: ceiling dropping to 300 feet agl and visibility of ½ mile in fog. There is no evidence the pilot requested or was advised of these revisions.
At 1849:58, the pilot tried to make initial radio contact with the Flight Service Station (FSS) at Québec on 122.3 MHz but received no response. He then tried on 126.7 MHz. The FSS specialist responded and asked the pilot to switch back to 122.3 MHz. Two-way communication was established at 1853:32. The pilot was advised that surface winds favored runway 11 and the altimeter setting was 30.25 inches of mercury. The pilot read back the setting correctly and advised he would proceed for runway 11.
At 1855:13, the FSS specialist gave the pilot the latest weather observation: a special bulletin issued at 2241 UTC indicating ceiling 500 feet agl and visibility ¾ mile in fog. Based on this, the pilot advised he would proceed for runway 29 but did not specify the approach type. At approximately 1856:07, about 7 nm southeast of Gaspé, the pilot requested clearance for an instrument approach, which he received less than one minute later. At 1857:20, the pilot pressed his microphone button seven times to switch the aerodrome lights to high. That was the last radio transmission received.
Wreckage and Impact
The aircraft crashed on the summit of a hill at approximately 300 feet above sea level, 1.2 nm northeast of the threshold of runway 29, and 0.8 nm north of the approach track. The swath cut through trees extended about 100 meters, following a trajectory directly toward the runway. The debris pattern indicated a high-speed, low-angle impact. A speed indicator showed 185 mph at impact, far greater than the normal approach speed of 110 mph. All flight control surfaces were retrieved, and all damage was attributed to impact forces. The flaps were retracted, and the landing gear was not down and locked. Several instruments, including altimeters, were destroyed. Engine examination showed both engines were producing power at impact; rpm could not be determined.
Investigation Findings
The aircraft was certified, equipped, and maintained in accordance with regulations. No evidence of airframe failure or system malfunction was found. Weight and center of gravity were within limits. The pilot held a valid airline transport pilot license with an instrument flight endorsement, had 5262 flying hours (3500 instrument), over 3000 hours on the PA-31, and was from the Gaspé region. Autopsy and toxicology indicated no physiological factors affected performance.
Staffing at Québec FSS was adequate. The FSS specialist had been on duty since 1115; workload was light. All equipment was in good condition. HF band radio interference was reported, which may have prevented the specialist from hearing the pilot's first transmissions on 122.3 MHz.
Radar coverage was not provided for low-altitude aircraft in uncontrolled airspace; military radar data showed only a short segment in cruise flight about 30 miles southeast of Gaspé, indicating the aircraft was heading directly for the airport at normal cruise speed, suggesting GPS navigation. The installed GPS (Garmin GPSMAP 295) was not certified for instrument navigation. Its condition post-impact prevented data retrieval.
Regulations allow instrument flights without a co-pilot if equipped with an autopilot; examination of the autopilot console did not reveal whether it was in operation. The aircraft was not equipped with a ground proximity warning system or radio altimeter, nor required.
The published minimum descent altitude for the runway 29 back course was 440 feet asl with visibility one mile. Even though reported visibility was less than minimum, the pilot was not prohibited from conducting the approach. The aircraft was found over 25 degrees to the right of the localizer track. The approach system at Gaspé (1970s design) and surrounding hilly terrain cause signal interference between 25 and 35 degrees from the localizer, causing the course deviation indicator to oscillate. A note on the approach plate warns that the localizer is not reliable beyond 25 degrees. In-flight tests after the accident showed navigation aids met operational requirements; no malfunctions were reported.
The emergency locator transmitter (ELT) was found with selector in automatic but did not activate because the battery disconnected on impact. Tests showed normal operation when battery was connected.
Occupants
All three occupants wore seat belts but were thrown from the aircraft with their seats due to impact force. There was no chance of survival because of the force of the impact.