Bell 206B Helicopter Collision with Terrain Near Swift Current, Saskatchewan

Incident Overview and Flight Details On the day of the occurrence, a leased Bell 206B helicopter, registration C-FIHL (serial number 2077), was being ferried by two pilots from Kitchener, Ontario, to its owners in Calgary, Alberta. The helicopter departed Regina, Saskatchewan, at 1340 central standard time on a visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan for Medicine Hat, Alberta, with an en route stop at Swift Current. The flight was crewed by a licensed junior pilot in the right seat and the company's chief pilot in the left seat, who was acting as an instructor and assisting with navigation. The chief pilot was qualified and approved to instruct from the left seat position and was expected to assume control in an emergency. Both pilots held valid Canadian commercial helicopter pilot licences endorsed for the Bell 206 type, but neither was instrument rated, meaning they were not authorized to operate in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). The operator was approved for Canadian Aviation Regulations (CARs) 702 and 703 operations. The return of the aircraft had been delayed for several weeks due to poor weather and maintenance requirements, and the company had decided to terminate the lease. The junior pilot had approximately 200 hours total time and was building flight hours under supervision on non-revenue flights. The chief pilot had over 30 years of helicopter experience, with approximately 13,000 hours total and 6,000 hours on the Bell 206. The day before the accident, the crew flew from Kitchener to Kenora. On the day of the accident, they took off from Kenora at 0820 eastern standard time, refueled in Brandon, Manitoba, and proceeded to Regina. During these flights, they encountered light snow showers. Prior to departure from Regina, the junior pilot filed a VFR flight plan to Medicine Hat with an en route stop at Swift Current. The forecast called for intermittent ceilings between 400 and 3,000 feet with flight visibilities of 4 to 10 miles in snow showers. The actual Swift Current weather at 1316 central standard time, passed to the junior pilot by Edmonton Flight Information Centre (FIC), reported a wind of 010° True at 8 mph, visibility of 1 mile, a ceiling of 100 feet overcast, and a temperature of −6°C. After liftoff from Regina at approximately 1345, the junior pilot requested that Edmonton FIC open their flight plan and amend it to show they would not be landing in Swift Current, as they had decided there was ample fuel to reach Medicine Hat. Eliminating the stop would increase their chances of arriving in Calgary later that same day, allowing them to complete end-of-lease documentation before the close of business on Friday and avoid three days of leasing expenses. Both pilots reported that arriving in Calgary on Friday was not crucial and that they would stop and wait for better weather if necessary. At 1449, the junior pilot contacted Edmonton FIC on the Swift Current mandatory frequency and advised that their position was 10 miles east of Swift Current at an altitude of 2,800 feet above sea level (approximately 150 feet above ground level). They requested to pass overhead the Swift Current airfield en route to Medicine Hat. Edmonton FIC advised C-FIHL that the flight would have to stay outside the Swift Current control zone because the vertical visibility was 100 feet, the ground visibility was 1/4 mile, and the weather was below minima for VFR operations. The junior pilot acknowledged the weather and replied that they would deviate to the south of the control zone. At this point, the crew had the option to divert around the poor weather or make a precautionary landing. The pilots later reported that the weather at their position was still suitable for VFR operations. They had purportedly mistaken the actual reported station weather for the forecast weather and did not expect the weather in the Swift Current area to be as bad as that which they encountered. Shortly after receiving the weather report, the visibility deteriorated, and the chief pilot assumed control of the aircraft. The weather continued to deteriorate below VFR weather minimums, and the accident occurred seven or eight minutes later when they encountered whiteout conditions. Whiteout is a meteorological phenomenon in which a person is unable to discern clouds and horizon from the surrounding surface terrain features. It occurs when natural sunlight is diffused by clouds or other obscuring phenomena such as fog, snow, or ice crystals. Flight in reduced visibility greatly increases the workload of VFR pilots. Studies have shown that non-instrument rated pilots are likely to lose control of an aircraft within 3 to 7 minutes after entering IMC conditions. The pilots were using a global positioning system (GPS) in conjunction with topographical maps as a means of VFR navigation in areas of reduced visibility and featureless terrain along the route of flight. At approximately 1455, they encountered snow showers that greatly reduced visibility, at which time the chief pilot assumed control of the helicopter. The visibility continued to worsen until the pilots encountered whiteout conditions and they lost all visual reference with the terrain. Shortly thereafter, the helicopter struck the snow-covered surface of a field four nautical miles southwest of the Swift Current, Saskatchewan, Airport. The accident occurred during daylight hours at approximately 1500. The aircraft was destroyed. The junior pilot sustained serious injuries, while the chief pilot suffered only minor injuries. Examination of the wreckage and surrounding area indicated that the damage to the main rotor and transmission mounts was consistent with a power-on, high-rpm impact with the ground. There was no information to suggest that any type of aircraft equipment malfunction occurred or that there were any pre-existing mechanical faults. The Canadian Aviation Regulations for VFR flight specify minimum visual meteorological conditions. In controlled airspace, the aircraft must be operated with visual reference to the surface, flight visibility must not be less than three miles, and the distance from cloud must not be less than 500 feet vertically and one mile horizontally. In uncontrolled airspace, the aircraft must be operated with visual reference to the surface, and at or above 1,000 feet AGL during the day, flight visibility must not be less than one mile, with a distance from cloud of not less than 500 feet vertically and 2,000 feet horizontally. For helicopters operated at less than 1,000 feet AGL during the day, flight visibility must not be less than one mile, and the aircraft must be operated clear of cloud. The pilots of C-FIHL were operating in VFR weather conditions when they were advised of IMC in the Swift Current area. The chief pilot chose to continue rather than divert or make a precautionary landing, and his decision to proceed toward an area of IMC resulted in the crew's loss of visual reference and collision with terrain. After the decision to continue, the pilots passed a point where their actual weather conditions changed to IMC. The use of the GPS assisted the crew in navigating in the deteriorating conditions beyond the point at which they could safely fly the helicopter. As a result, they lost control and the helicopter struck the ground. The fact that the pilots had earlier encountered and now anticipated less severe weather than was reported for Swift Current influenced the chief pilot's decision to proceed into IMC. Financial and personal considerations resulting from a late arrival in Calgary may have contributed to the pressure felt by the chief pilot to reach Calgary. The Transportation Safety Board's investigation concluded that the chief pilot's decision to continue a visual flight into instrument meteorological conditions resulted in his inability to maintain control of the helicopter, and as a result, the helicopter was inadvertently flown into the snow-covered terrain. The chief pilot's decision to continue into deteriorating weather conditions was influenced by a mistaken expectation that the weather at Swift Current was better than the reported conditions and the pressure to reach Calgary on the day of the occurrence. The pilots disregarded the safe limits with regard to VFR flight, as described in Canadian Aviation Regulations. The pilots' use of GPS assisted them in navigating into weather conditions in which they could not safely fly the helicopter. This report concludes the Transportation Safety Board's investigation into this occurrence. Consequently, the Board authorized the release of this report on 22 December 2004.