Accident Sequence
The Piper PA-31-350 Chieftain (registration C-GNAY, serial number 31-8052095) departed from its home base at Vancouver, British Columbia, with two crew members on board for a repositioning flight to Powell River, estimated at 30 minutes, to commence a freight collection route. Upon arrival, the crew joined the circuit straight-in to a right downwind for a visual approach to Runway 09. A weather system was passing through, with shifting winds from light southwesterly to gusty conditions from the northwest ranging from 11 to 37 knots. During final approach, the aircraft was lower and faster than normal and not aligned with the runway. The crew executed an overshoot and set up for a second approach.
On the second approach at about 1639 Pacific standard time, the aircraft touched down at least halfway down the wet runway and began to hydroplane. After touchdown, engine power was added in an unsuccessful attempt to abort the landing and overshoot. The aircraft overran the runway end and crashed into an unprepared area within the airport property. The pilot-in-command suffered serious injuries, and the first officer was fatally injured. A local resident called 911. The pilot-in-command was attended by paramedics and removed with the assistance of firefighters. The aircraft was destroyed; no fire occurred. The ELT activated but its signal was weak and not detected by search and rescue satellites.
Aircraft Information
The aircraft was configured for cargo operations and was empty at the time. It was within weight limits. It was not equipped with a CVR or FDR, as not required by regulation. A deferred defect rendered the ADF unreliable, restricting the aircraft to VFR operations; a placard was mounted on the instrument panel. Technical records and wreckage showed no outstanding defects that could have contributed. The aircraft had a panel-mounted GPS, but no meaningful data was recovered. The POH states that under conditions of a level, dry asphalt runway, full flaps, approach speed of 95 knots, and 10-knot tailwind, the aircraft should stop in about 960 feet of ground roll with maximum braking. If landing halfway down the 1106 m runway, about 1814 feet remained plus 207 feet before an embankment.
Airport Information
Runway 09 at Powell River Airport is 1106 m (3627 ft) long, meeting Transport Canada's TP 312 standards. The embankment 63 m beyond the runway end is outside the runway strip-end overrun area and not under guidelines for surface preparation. Recent Transport Canada audits found no outstanding issues. Published airport information indicated a 2% up slope; a NOTAM on 10 November 2004 advised a 1.5% up slope. The airport has a mandatory frequency but no ground station or advisory service. Recommended arrival procedure at uncontrolled airports without advisory is to overfly before joining the circuit.
Flight Crew
The captain was employed since November 2005, held a Canadian commercial pilot licence with medical valid to 01 June 2006, a PPC on the Chieftain, and a Group 1 instrument rating. He had 1200 total flight hours, previous experience on the route as a first officer, and training in pilot decision making, CRM, and multi-crew operations. The first officer was employed since February 2006, held a Canadian commercial pilot licence with medical valid to 01 July 2006, a Group 1 instrument rating, and a PPC on the Chieftain, with 500 total hours and previous Chieftain experience. The pilots had worked together the previous two days, with a day off before that. Duty times for the last seven days were about 65 hours each. This was the third flight of the day.
Meteorological Information
The weather forecast called for instrument or marginal VMC throughout the day with a warm front followed by a cold front from the west. Winds ahead of the cold front from southeast at 30 knots, veering to northwest at 25 knots with passage. Moderate to severe turbulence expected from surface to 3000 ft asl. A pre-flight weather package printed at about 0500 was retrieved; it included METARs, significant weather forecasts, TAFs, pilot reports, GFAs, forecast upper winds, and NOTAMs. The GFA valid at 0400 placed the cold front near Powell River by about 1400. An updated GFA valid at 1000 forecast the cold front near Comox by 1300, expected to pass Powell River within another hour; it is unknown if the crew received this. Communication records showed the crew obtained weather updates by telephone throughout the day, last at about 1513 (45 minutes before departure). During that briefing, no specific questions about the cold front location or speed. The 1500 METAR for Comox showed wind had shifted to the southwest. A significant weather report (Sigmet L6) at 1510 warned of continued severe turbulence below 3000 ft due to low-level jet stream. No updated weather was requested or received after 1513. The Powell River Airport weather station was staffed and provided hourly reports. TAFs were not produced for Powell River. Winds at Powell River had been consistently from the east at 24 knots gusting to 50 knots throughout the day. The 1600 weather report is not detailed in the source.
Wreckage Examination
During the crash sequence, the aircraft travelled beyond the runway end lights, across 54 m of asphalt, then 9 m of grass, then over a 3-m embankment. It contacted the upper portion of a deer fence, then a dirt berm, bounced into the air, and came to rest in a flat field about 113 m from the runway end lights. No tire marks were observed on the asphalt; both main landing gear tires showed damage from rubber-reversion due to hydroplaning. Grass tracks showed initial braking then skid. No nose gear tracks were found between leaving asphalt and the embankment. Cockpit switch positions were consistent with pre-landing checklist completion except engine power controls set for takeoff power, landing gear selector up, wing flaps up (confirmed fully retracted at impact). Flaps are not required for takeoff or landing. Left main gear was extended but down-lock not engaged, allowing free movement. Right main gear extended at impact and broke rearward. Nose wheel doors showed nose wheel fully retracted and doors closed when aircraft struck the berm. Both main gear wheel cover doors were open at impact and detached; normally closed except during gear transition. Safety features require a micro-switch on left main gear to be disengaged by oleo extension before gear-up selection, and the gear lever must be pulled to bypass a safety arm. For the micro-switch to disengage, the aircraft had to be light on wheels or bouncing. Left ASI showed about 74 knots, right ASI about 67 knots; stall speed with zero flaps is 71 knots, with full flaps 67 knots. POH stall speed at accident weight with zero flaps and idle power is 71 knots. Propeller blades had circumferential scoring and abrasion, and mid-length bending, consistent with brief tip contact and high power at impact. Brake assemblies had no anomalies. The ELT, when reconnected to the antenna, transmitted a strong signal.