Occurrence
At approximately 1548 Central Daylight Time on 25 April 2021, a Great Slave Helicopters 2018 Ltd. Airbus Helicopters AS 350 B2 (registration C-FYDA, serial number 4157) departed from a remote camp on Russell Island, Nunavut, on a day visual flight rules (VFR) flight to Resolute Bay Airport, Nunavut, located 87 nautical miles to the northeast. On board were the pilot, an aircraft maintenance engineer, and a biologist. The flight aimed to return to Resolute Bay after 12 days of polar bear research, as poor weather was forecast for the area in the coming days.
At approximately 1633 Central Daylight Time, the helicopter impacted snow-covered terrain on Griffith Island, Nunavut, about 12 nautical miles southwest of Resolute Bay Airport, on a near-reciprocal track to the intended route. The helicopter was destroyed, and a post-impact fire consumed much of the fuselage. The emergency locator transmitter was destroyed during impact and did not transmit a distress signal. There were no survivors.
Investigation
The investigation examined factors that likely influenced the pilot's decision-making, organizational defences at Great Slave Helicopters 2018 Ltd., and the regulatory environment.
Pilot Decision Making
The Transport Canada Aeronautical Information Manual provides limited guidance on recognizing and coping with flat light and whiteout conditions. The pilot's limited experience operating above the tree line during winter and spring likely lowered his risk perception, influencing the decision to continue flight over featureless snow-covered terrain under overcast skies and poor visibility. The pilot likely relied heavily on the client's assessment that weather was suitable, leading him to forgo additional weather information or a formal briefing. This reduced safety margins.
Defences Against Inadvertent Flight into Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IIMC)
When the helicopter approached the highest elevation on Griffith Island, uniformly snow-covered terrain, overcast sky, and snow squalls likely created flat light and whiteout conditions, resulting in IIMC. While the pilot likely attempted to manoeuvre visually in response, an unintentional descent led to impact on a near-reciprocal track.
Training
The pilot's decision to depart was based on an incomplete understanding of forecast weather along the route. Current regulations for day VFR helicopter operations focus on avoiding IIMC, with no requirement for training to recover from an IIMC encounter. The TSB previously called for verification of proficiency in basic instrument flying skills for commercial helicopter pilots during annual checks, but Transport Canada has not implemented sufficient measures.
Technology
Regulations do not require VFR helicopters to be equipped with technology to assist with avoidance and recovery from IIMC, such as enhanced flight instrumentation or radar altimeters. The TSB has made recommendations on this issue for over 30 years without adequate action from Transport Canada.
Regulatory Environment
Great Slave Helicopters 2018 Ltd. relied on pilot ability to avoid IIMC, without requiring skills for recovery. Standard operating procedures (SOPs) are not required for single-pilot operations under subparts 604, 702, 703, and 704 of the Canadian Aviation Regulations, depriving pilots of decision-making support.
Helicopter requirements for reduced-visibility operations in uncontrolled airspace are less strict than for airplanes, despite helicopter accidents being more than twice as likely to involve loss of visual reference. The TSB recommended enhancing requirements for helicopter operators.
Safety Management
Although not required, Great Slave Helicopters 2018 Ltd. implemented a safety management system. The investigation found that its risk management process overestimated the pilot's operational readiness and the ability of existing defences to mitigate flat light and whiteout risks, leading to insufficient safeguards.
Safety Action Taken
Following the accident, Great Slave Helicopters 2018 Ltd. took several actions: a company-wide safety stand-down, amendments to SOPs, enhanced training on overdue aircraft procedures, increased recurrent pilot training on decision making, changes to its safety management system, implementation of quarterly safety meetings, and creation of a sub-committee for review of safety reports.