Casualties unknown

1993-11-25: De Havilland DHC-8 C-GONX and — Between Air Ontario Ltd. — Canadian Forces Canadair Ltd. CT-114 Tutor, CA

Canadian Forces Canadair Ltd. CT-114 Tutor, CA

On November 25, 1993, a De Havilland DHC-8 C-GONX and operated by Between Air Ontario Ltd. was involved in an aviation accident near Canadian Forces Canadair Ltd. CT-114 Tutor, CA. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The tower controller positioned ONT294 on the active runway and cleared it for take-off without establishing direct pilot-controller communications with BDIT22. This summary draws on records from the Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB).

Sourcesthe Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB)Primary reportUpdated 1785068748Data APIEditorial standards

On November 25, 1993, a Canadian Forces Tutor (BDIT22) and an Air Ontario DHC-8 (ONT294) were involved in a runway incursion incident at Sault Ste. Marie Airport. The tower controller cleared ONT294 for take-off without establishing direct communication with BDIT22, leading to a missed approach by BDIT22. No injuries or damage occurred.

History of the Flight

Bandit 22 (BDIT22), a Canadair CT-114 Tutor operated by the Canadian Forces, was inbound to Sault Ste. Marie Airport, Ontario, from Winnipeg, Manitoba, on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. It was cleared for an instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 11. Approximately three miles from the final approach fix, the approach clearance was cancelled because the aircraft was too high, and the crew was instructed to perform a descending 360-degree turn to the left to re-intercept the localizer at a lower altitude. During this turn, the sector controller issued a contact approach clearance and coordinated a transfer of control to the tower controller.

Air Ontario flight 294 (ONT294), a De Havilland DHC-8 (registration C-GONX), was on an IFR flight plan from Sault Ste. Marie to Toronto/Lester B. Pearson International Airport. The tower controller cleared ONT294 to position and hold on the active runway. After control of BDIT22 was passed to the tower and an IFR release for ONT294 was obtained, the tower controller cleared ONT294 for take-off. The tower controller attempted several times to contact BDIT22 by radio but was unsuccessful. He then cancelled the take-off clearance for ONT294 and instructed the crew to hold position. Eventually, radio contact was established with BDIT22, and the aircraft conducted a missed approach.

Weather Conditions

The 1800 EST surface weather at Sault Ste. Marie reported: 1,000 feet scattered, measured ceiling 1,500 feet broken, 10,000 feet overcast, visibility 15 miles, temperature minus 4°C, dew point minus 6°C, wind 100° at 12 knots, altimeter 30.41 inches of mercury. These conditions were visual meteorological.

Air Traffic Control Procedures

The ATC Manual of Operations (MANOPS) Section 362.5 states that a tower controller may assume control of an arriving IFR or CVFR aircraft provided VFR conditions exist, the controller has sighted the aircraft and is satisfied it will remain in sight, the aircraft intends to land, and it is at a position agreed upon with the IFR controller. Section 351.1 directs controllers to issue clearances to maintain safe and orderly traffic flow. Section 352.2 specifies separation requirements for arriving aircraft from preceding aircraft using the same runway.

A memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the Toronto Area Control Centre (ACC) and Sault Ste. Marie Tower defined automatic transfer of control for inbound IFR flights when ceiling was at least 3,000 feet and visibility five miles or greater. The tower controller requested control of each inbound aircraft as it passed the Gros Cap beacon (about four miles final for runway 11). The sector controller agreed to this transfer.

Transfer of Control

The tower controller planned to establish radio contact with BDIT22 near the Gros Cap beacon, notify the crew of the departing ONT294, and request speed reduction or a circuit to allow ONT294 to depart with minimal delay. However, after the sector controller cleared BDIT22 for the contact approach, he delayed the instruction to switch to the tower frequency for more than one minute. The reason for this delay could not be established.

The tower controller cleared ONT294 to position and hold on the runway and then cleared it for take-off before establishing direct communication with BDIT22. The sector controller had agreed to the transfer of control and had BDIT22 in sight but did not ensure communication was established.

Findings

The Board determined that the tower controller positioned ONT294 on the active runway and cleared it for take-off without establishing direct pilot-controller communications with BDIT22.

Probable cause

The tower controller positioned ONT294 on the active runway and cleared it for take-off without establishing direct pilot-controller communications with BDIT22.