Accident Summary
On the morning of the accident, Bearskin Lake Air Services flight BLS 340, a Fairchild Metro SA-227-AC registered as C-FFZN (serial number AC-785B), was landing on runway 11 at Dryden, Ontario. The aircraft touched down long, ran off the end of the runway, and collided with approach lights and the instrument landing system localizer antennae. It came to rest about 300 feet past the runway end, and the crew shut down the engines. The captain notified Thunder Bay flight service station of the overrun. Passengers observed a fire in the left engine tail pipe before deplaning. After a short delay, crew and passengers deplaned and walked to the Ontario Government Fire Centre building. The captain later returned and activated the fire bottle for the right engine. There were no injuries, but the aircraft was substantially damaged. Airport staff saw no fire after deplaning. Emergency Response Services in Dryden were not notified and did not respond.
Crew and Aircraft Information
The 37-year-old captain held an Airline Transport Pilot Licence (ATPL) and had over 5000 total flying hours, with about 365 hours on multi-engine aircraft and approximately 3160 hours as an instructor pilot. He upgraded to Metro captain in September 1999 and completed line indoctrination in October 1999. No record indicated crew resource management (CRM) training; Bearskin Lake Air Services did not provide CRM training at the time. The 30-year-old first officer had about 2000 total flying hours, with about 450 hours on multi-engine aircraft, and held an ATPL with a Group 1 instrument rating. He joined the company in September 1999 and completed first officer line indoctrination in October 1999. He had some CRM training in 1996. Both pilots received part of their training from the company and part on a simulator at Flight Safety International.
Flight and Weather Conditions
The flight crew had flown several legs the day before, arriving in Kenora, Ontario, around 2200 central standard time. After a night's rest, they departed for Dryden at 0755 with six passengers. Prior to departure, the first officer obtained a weather package including a Dryden airport surface condition report issued at 0633, which indicated a 150-foot-wide swept strip down the centre with a Canadian Runway Friction Index (CRFI) of 0.37 (the remainder was 100% heavy frost covered). The weather for 0700: wind 260° at 2 knots, visibility 5 statute miles, overcast at 1500 feet, temperature -2°C, dewpoint -3°C, altimeter 29.84 inHg. The first officer did not consider the CRFI significant and did not discuss it with the captain. The crew did not request or receive any CRFI updates from ATC or flight service station (FSS). The original runway condition report correctly indicated the centre 100 feet swept, but the report issued by Thunder Bay FSS incorrectly stated 150 feet swept (the runway is 150 feet wide).
Weather at Dryden at 0800 (about 15 minutes before accident): wind 280° at 4 knots, visibility 1.75 sm in light freezing drizzle and mist, overcast at 1300 feet, temperature -2°C, dewpoint -3°C, altimeter 29.84 inHg. Wind was 280° at 4 knots, visibility 1.75 sm in light freezing drizzle and mist, overcast at 1300 feet. The crew received this information before their ILS approach. Runway visual range (RVR) for runway 11 was 5500 feet, runway lights on strength three. The crew was advised that an aircraft four minutes ahead had completed an ILS approach and landing from 200-foot minimums. A special observation after the accident reported overcast at 600 feet; other observations unchanged. RVR at accident time is not recorded.
Approach and Landing Sequence
The captain was pilot flying, the first officer pilot-not-flying. The flight data recorder (FDR) showed the aircraft established on the glide path with tailwind compensation, stable at 140 knots IAS until about 2.5 nautical miles (nm) from the threshold. Then power increased by about 5 pounds of torque, descent rate halved, and the aircraft became high on the glide slope. At about 1 nm, power reduced and descent rate increased, but the aircraft remained high, with IAS increasing to 150 knots. From over 2 nm back, the aircraft was 50–100 feet above the glide path; at the threshold it was about 90 feet above; at the runway/glide slope intercept point it was about 100 feet above. The aircraft touched down long, overran the runway, and collided with approach lights and localizer antenna.
Post-Accident Examination
The aircraft was examined in a hangar after being towed from the accident site. Substantial damage to propellers, landing gear, and structure from collision with localizer antenna and approach lighting. Two right propeller blade tips broke off, puncturing the right fuselage and cracking a cabin window (no penetration into cabin). The right engine fire bottle was discharged. The brake system (no anti-skid) had no mechanical failures; firm resistance on toe-brake; all main wheel tires showed brake application damage. Instruments tested: captain's altimeter 60 feet high (unserviceable); first officer's airspeed indicator 5 knots high in approach range; radar altimeter unserviceable; captain's HSI glide slope indicator sluggish and tending to stick above on-glide-slope mark (tapping corrected it). Flaps were fully extended; after repairs, extension times and deflections were correct.
Runway and Approach Aids
Runway 11 at Dryden is 6000 feet long, threshold elevation 1354 feet asl, with a 200-foot paved manoeuvring area before the threshold. Taxiway Alpha about 2500 feet from threshold leads to apron and terminal. The ILS approach has a 3° glide slope, decision height 200 feet agl (1554 asl). Glide slope positions aircraft at 55 feet agl at threshold; recommended visibility 0.75 sm or RVR 4000 feet. Approach lighting includes two unidirectional strobe lights before the manoeuvring area, threshold green lights, runway end red lights, medium intensity with three settings, and a two-bar VASIS left of threshold.
Operational Procedures
Company SOPs require all approaches to be monitored by the pilot-not-flying and specify procedures. SOPs state 140 knots IAS on final approach segment, reducing to V Ref over threshold. V Ref for landing weight was 109 knots IAS. The AFM gives landing distance about 2500 feet (ground roll 1675 feet) for threshold crossing of 50 feet. Using CRFI 0.37, estimated landing distance 4700 feet with reverse thrust (ground roll 3875 feet). The crew did not request or receive any updated CRFI.