History of the Flight
Kelowna Flightcraft Air Charter Ltd. operated a Douglas DC-3C, registration C-GWUG, under charter to Purolator Courier Ltd. The aircraft was dedicated to cargo transport between Vancouver and Nanaimo, British Columbia, since April 1998. On the day of the accident, the flight, operating as KFA300, was rerouted via Victoria due to the delayed arrival of a Purolator Boeing 727 caused by weather in Ontario. The crew received a pre-flight planning package with filed IFR flight plans for both legs, but the captain cancelled the IFR plan and filed VFR upon first contact with air traffic control.
The flight departed Vancouver International Airport at night under visual flight rules, bound for Victoria International Airport. En route, the aircraft collided with trees on Mount Parke, Mayne Island, approximately 14 miles from Victoria. The initial impact occurred at about 900 feet above sea level. The aircraft then fell into a valley and was destroyed by a post-crash fire. The two pilots, the sole occupants, sustained fatal injuries. The accident occurred at 0633 Pacific standard time.
Analysis and Findings
The investigation determined that a mechanical malfunction was unlikely based on maintenance logs, radar data, and physical evidence. The flight was conducted at night under VFR well below the minimum obstacle clearance altitude prescribed by Canadian Aviation Regulations (CARs). The crew had a consistent practice of cancelling IFR flight plans and flying VFR, likely perceived as more efficient, though unaware of the night VFR obstacle clearance regulation. This lack of awareness was not unique, as previous TSB investigations found similar deficiencies in other companies.
The crew's pre-flight weather package indicated a lowest ceiling of 2000 feet at Victoria, but ATIS information received before departure indicated 1000 feet. A subsequent special observation of 800 feet was transmitted six minutes before impact and likely not received. Radar showed the aircraft descending to a level flight altitude of 900 feet, slightly above the 800-foot cloud base reported over Mayne Island. The aircraft entered or flew above the low cloud ceiling before striking trees in level flight without warning.
Neither the company's flight followers, chief pilot, director of flight operations, nor Transport Canada inspectors were aware that the DC-3 operation was routinely conducted under VFR without regard for obstacle clearance requirements. The aircraft was not equipped with a ground proximity warning system (GPWS), which could have alerted the crew. Although GPWS is required on larger passenger jets, it was not required for dedicated cargo or propeller-driven aircraft under CARs Part VII.
The aircraft carried a small amount of dangerous goods, properly packaged and manifested, but air traffic control, search and rescue, and first responders were not informed, placing them at increased risk after the crash.
Safety Actions Taken
Following the accident, Kelowna Flightcraft amended its operations manual on 14 January 1999 to include night VFR obstacle clearance restrictions. A memorandum to all pilots on 15 January 1999 highlighted minimum obstacle clearance regulations and prohibited night VFR flights without approval from the director of flight operations or chief pilot. The company also installed an Internet-based flight monitoring system (Flight Explorer) for real-time tracking.
Transport Canada issued Commercial and Business Aviation Advisory Circulars (CBAACs) reiterating night VFR requirements, mandating CFIT avoidance training for Part 703, 704, and 705 operators, and proposing amendments to restrict night VFR operations for commuter and airline operators. The British Columbia Chief Coroner held an inquest and recommended that Transport Canada pursue GPWS requirements for all aircraft operating under CARs 703, 704, and 705; the Minister of Transport responded by noting commitment to harmonize regulations with the FAA.