What happened
On 26 May 2021, an Airbus A3/19-111, registration G-EZAJ, arrived at Lasham Airfield from Gatwick Airport. Prior to the arrival, a change in the flight schedule had occurred; the aircraft was now expected significantly earlier than originally communicated to the airfield's various stakeholders.
On the morning of the arrival, a winch team was performing maintenance on synthetic launch cables, which involved cutting and re-splicing the lines. This process required the cables to be laid out along the south side of Runway 27. While the duty instructor at the gliding club was aware of the updated arrival time for G-EZAJ, they were unaware of the ongoing cable maintenance. Consequently, the winch team was not notified of the accelerated arrival.
As the aircraft approached, the Air-Ground Operator (AGO) initially advised air traffic controllers that the runway was not yet available due to the presence of the cables. However, as the aircraft entered the visual circuit, the Senior Fire Officer (SFO) determined that there was insufficient time to retrieve the cables and subsequently declared the runway available. The crew of G-EZAJ was informed of the cables' presence via Lasham Radio, but they were not notified that the cables remained on the ground when the runway was cleared for landing. The aircraft landed within the touchdown zone, with the cables still positioned on the grass abeam the southern edge of the runway.
The investigation
The investigation examined the communication protocols between the maintenance organisation (MRO), the gliding club, and the airfield fire service. It established that a lack of coordination led to critical information gaps. Specifically, the winch team was not alerted to the updated flight timing, and the flying staff were unaware of the maintenance activities.
Investigators also looked into the decision-making process of the airfield personnel. It was found that the SFO lacked specific written guidance defining what constituted a "secure" runway strip, leaving the determination to individual discretion. Furthermore, the investigation noted that the SFO may have felt pressured to declare the runway available because the aircraft was already established in the circuit.
Findings
- There was a significant absence of coordination between different airfield users regarding aircraft arrival times and maintenance schedules.
- The Air-Ground Operator was not informed that the cables remained near the runway when the runway was declared available.
- The commander of G-EZAJ was provided with an incomplete picture of the runway conditions, which prevented them from requesting a hold or an additional circuit.
- The SFO likely felt pressure to clear the runway due to the aircraft's proximity in the circuit.
- There was no formal written standard for the SFO to determine if the runway strip was sufficiently secure.