Incident Overview
On 14 April 2016, an Airbus A319-111, registration G-EZFJ, experienced a serious incident during takeoff from Malaga Airport, Spain. The aircraft, operated on a scheduled commercial passenger flight to Liverpool International Airport, departed from Runway 31 using takeoff performance data calculated for Runway 13. The crew and passengers were uninjured, and the aircraft sustained no damage.
Flight Details
The flight crew consisted of a commander (Line Training Captain, 57 years old, with 21,000 total hours including 4,000 on type) and a co-pilot under training. The commander acted as Pilot Flying (PF) and the co-pilot as Pilot Monitoring (PM). Runway 31 was in use with wind from 300° varying between 270° and 340° at 5 kt. During takeoff performance calculation using the Electronic Flight Bag (EFB), the co-pilot suggested using the Multiple Runway Computation (MRC) function in case the departure runway changed to Runway 13. The commander agreed as a training exercise, though MRC was not part of the line training syllabus. The operator’s standard operating procedures (SOPs) allowed either single runway or MRC.
EFB and Software Anomaly
The EFB was a ruggedised touchscreen PC with Windows 7 and Airbus FlySmart software version L5.0.3. For MRC, after entering conditions, the crew selected multiple runways and computed performance. However, due to a software anomaly, after switching to the load sheet screen to update and then returning to the performance screen, the EFB displayed detailed runway information for Runway 31 (correct length and engine-out procedure) alongside takeoff performance data for Runway 13. This was confirmed by a photograph taken by the crew. The manufacturer and operator were unaware of this anomaly at the time.
Cross-Checking Process
The commander cross-checked the critical data entry per SOPs, verifying that Runway 31 was displayed in the drop-down box and that the runway length was correct (both runways have identical takeoff run available of 3,200 m). He noted that the takeoff speeds were lower than expected and the thrust reduction altitude was lower, but attributed this to possible recent operational changes. The takeoff proceeded normally. In cruise, the commander rechecked the calculations and discovered the discrepancy.
Aftermath
The operator subsequently disabled the MRC function in the EFB, and the manufacturer communicated the anomaly to all affected operators. The AAIB reproduced the anomaly following the sequence of events discovered by the operator.