What happened
On 16 October 2015, an Airbus A319-111, registration G-EZIV, was preparing for a scheduled passenger flight from Lisbon Airport, Portugal, to Basel Mulhouse Airport, Switzerland. During the pre-flight phase, the crew noted that while Runway 21 was currently active, Runway 03 might be used due to light and variable winds.
Prior to pushback, the co-pilot entered weather data and Runway 03 into the Electronic Flight Bag (EFB), even though the ATIS indicated Runway 21 was in use. Based on this incorrect runway designation, the commander calculated takeoff performance for a departure from Runway 03 at Intersection November Two. This error went undetected during the crew's crosschecking procedures.
As the takeoff data was being entered into the Flight Management Guidance Computer (FMGC), the commander was distracted by individuals entering the cockpit. Consequently, the Engine Out Standard Instrument Departure (EOSID) in the FMGC was not verified against the EFB. The commander performed the departure briefing from memory, which failed to reveal the discrepancy. The crew only realized the error when the aircraft approached V1 and they observed limited runway remaining. There were no injuries and no damage to the aircraft.
The investigation
An investigation by the AAIB established that the aircraft departed from Runway 21 at Intersection Uniform Five with a takeoff weight of 62.8 tonnes. Flight Data Monitoring revealed that at the V1 speed of 153 KIAS, only about 580 metres of runway remained. By the time the aircraft rotated, approximately 297 metres remained, and only 213 metres were left as the aircraft became airborne. The investigation confirmed that the performance figures used were intended for a much longer runway distance (3,530 m) than the actual available distance (2,410 m).
Findings
- The crew used takeoff performance data for Runway 03 at Intersection November Two instead of the required figures for Runway 21 at Intersection Uniform Five.
- The error was not identified during crosschecks due to cockpit distractions and crew complacency.
- The commander's attention was diverted by persons entering the cockpit during the data entry process.
- The EOSID briefing was conducted from memory rather than through a formal verification of the FMGC and EFB data.