Aircraft and Location
On 30 April 2019, at approximately 0647 UTC, a ground collision occurred on Stand 24 at East Midlands Airport (EMA) involving two Boeing 737 aircraft: EI-SEV, a Boeing 737-73S (year of manufacture 1999, serial no. 29078), and G-GDFB, a Boeing 737-33A (year of manufacture 1992, serial no. 25743). EI-SEV was on a positioning flight (non-revenue) with two crew and no passengers; G-GDFB had no crew or passengers on board. No injuries were reported.
Event Sequence
Low Visibility Procedures (LVPs) were in force, with a reported Runway Visual Range of 300 to 325 m. Air traffic controllers, due to their elevated position and poor weather, could not see the apron area. The Surface Movement Radar (SMR) display did not show stationary targets, so G-GDFB on Stand 24 was not visible to controllers. The ground movements controller cleared EI-SEV to taxi via Taxiway Quebec to Stand 22, unaware that Stand 24 was occupied.
As EI-SEV turned left from Taxiway Quebec towards Stand 22, the flight crew observed G-GDFB parked on Stand 24. Noting the tight clearance, they were reassured by the parked aircraft's position on the stop bar. The commander reduced taxi speed to a slow walk, and the co-pilot monitored the right wing tip, which appeared clear. However, as EI-SEV passed behind G-GDFB, its right winglet struck the right horizontal stabiliser of G-GDFB. The commander halted and reported the collision to ATC.
Damage
EI-SEV's right winglet was partially detached. G-GDFB sustained damage to the underside of its right horizontal stabiliser.
Airfield Information
G-GDFB was a Boeing 737-300 (B733) series aircraft, approximately 6 m shorter than a Boeing 737-800 (B738). Stand 24 had stop lines only for Airbus A321 and B738 aircraft. The UK Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) and pilots' airfield charts did not indicate any wingtip clearance issues at that location.
Recorded Information
Airport CCTV and SMR footage showed that neither system could alert controllers to the collision risk under the prevailing conditions. CCTV was obscured by fog, and SMR was not designed to display stationary targets. The airport operator had already begun scoping for an improved SMR or Advanced Surface Movement Guidance Control System (ASMGCS).
Human Factors
The flight crew reported being well rested, with a rest period of 11 hours 43 minutes. Both pilots were based at EMA but had not previously operated from the remote stands in question. The commander considered that if a B738 had been parked on Stand 24, the insufficient clearance would have been more apparent. A previous investigation by the Air Accident Investigation Unit Ireland highlighted limitations in judging relative distances at close quarters, particularly with winglet-equipped aircraft.
Follow-Up Actions
Following the accident, the airport operator closed Stand 22 pending a safety review and surveyed parking stands to identify similar taxi-separation hazards. The operators of both aircraft alerted their EMA-based flight crew to the hazard, and EI-SEV's operator issued a Company NOTAM. The EMA ATC Final Investigation Report noted that better visibility would have allowed controllers to visually acquire the obstruction and offer a different route.