Incident Overview
On 23 August 2018, a Sikorsky S-92A helicopter, registration G-CKXL, operated a multi-sector flight between platforms in the Brae field, approximately 150 nm north-east of Aberdeen. During the third sector, the crew mistakenly identified the Brae Bravo platform as their destination and conducted an approach to a hover above its helideck. The platform's radio operator informed the pilots that they had approached the wrong deck. After receiving clearance to depart, the crew continued the flight without further issues. No injuries were reported and no damage occurred.
Flight Crew
The commander, an experienced offshore pilot and line training captain, occupied the right seat as Pilot Monitoring. The co-pilot, an ab-initio pilot on his third line training flight following type conversion, was Pilot Flying from the left seat. The flight was designated as a 3rd line training flight.
Flight History
The planned route was Aberdeen/Dyce (EGPD) – Brae Bravo (BRAB) – East Brae (EBRA) – Brae Alpha (BRAA) – Aberdeen/Dyce. The first sector to Brae Bravo was uneventful. During the second sector to East Brae, the commander took control from the co-pilot due to handling difficulties during the hover. After debriefing, the crew confirmed the next destination as Brae Alpha and proceeded.
On departure from East Brae, the co-pilot flew manually. The commander, seeing a platform ahead, misidentified it as Brae Alpha. Both pilots noted that the Flight Management System (FMS) needles indicated the platform ahead, aligning with their expectations. They conducted abbreviated shuttle final checks, omitting the final two items (arming floats and confirming deck name) until later. The co-pilot flew around the flare-stack and positioned the helicopter in a hover over the helideck. The radar was off as permitted by the checks. The co-pilot did not read the deck name, and the commander, unable to see the helideck, did not prompt a confirmation.
Platform Configuration
The Brae field comprises three platforms: Brae Alpha (BRAA), Brae Bravo (BRAB), and East Brae (EBRA), aligned northeast-southwest. All helidecks are on the south-south-west corner with similar headings of 198°. Differences include flare-stack and derrick configurations: Brae Bravo has a single horizontal flare-stack protruding from the northwest side and one vertical derrick; Brae Alpha has two diagonal flare-stacks and two derricks; East Brae has a diagonal flare-stack and one derrick.
Navigation and Briefing
During pre-flight planning, the crew consulted the Heli-deck Directory (HD) and Navblue charts, reviewing platform information, limitations, and wind sectors. They discussed flare-stack positions but did not primarily use the plates for platform identification. The FMS provided GPS guidance and was loaded with standard and operator-specific databases. The crew entered the route manually into the FMS.
Meteorological Conditions
Forecast winds were southerly at about 20 kt with scattered cloud above 1,500 ft. Twenty minutes post-incident, weather at Brae Alpha was CAVOK with wind 200°M at 21 kt.
Operator Response
The operator stated that additional training would be conducted addressing task management requirements and complexity during shuttling to prevent a recurrence.