What happened
On 23 August 2018, a Sikorsky S-92A, registration G-CKXL, was performing a multi-sector commercial air transport flight between various platforms in the Brae field of the northern North Sea. The flight was part of a line training session for a co-pilot.
During the third leg of the journey, intended to move from the East Brae platform to the Brae Alpha platform, the crew misidentified the Braatt Bravo platform as their destination. The pilot flying proceeded with a manual approach, maneuvering the aircraft around the flare-stack and entering a hover over the incorrect helideck. The error was only discovered when the radio operator on the Brae Bravo platform contacted the crew to notify them that they were approaching the wrong deck. After receiving clearance to depart, the crew continued the flight without further incident.
The investigation
The investigation examined the cockpit environment, the flight planning process, and the physical characteristics of the offshore installations. It was established that the crew had conducted pre-flight planning and reviewed the Heli-deck Directory, but they did not use the information to establish specific visual identification cues for the different platforms.
Investigators found that the alignment of the platforms in the Brae field contributed to the error, as the Brae Bravo platform sat in a position that made it a salient target during the turn. The investigation also looked at the workload of the crew, noting that the pilot in command was acting as the pilot monitoring while simultaneously coaching a trainee pilot through a manual handling task.
Findings
- The primary cause of the incident was the misidentification and incorrect selection of the Brae Bravo platform as the destination.
- High workload during the "shuttling" process, combined with the pressures of a line training environment, reduced the crew's ability to detect the error.
- Expectation and confirmation bias played a significant role; the pilot in command visually identified a platform that matched his mental model of the expected approach path.
- The decision to fly the short sector manually, while appropriate for training, removed the automated navigation protections that might have highlighted the discrepancy in distance or routing.
- The physical similarity of the platforms and their alignment made the incorrect platform appear to be the correct target.
Safety action
Following the incident, the operator committed to several training improvements, including:
- Implementing additional training to address the complex task management requirements of offshore shuttling.
- Emphasizing the importance of strict adherence to standard operating procedures and checklists.
- Reviewing shuttle check procedures to prevent recurrence.