What happened
On 22 August 2014, a Sikorsky S-92A, registration G-VINL, was performing a multi-sector passenger and freight flight in the North Sea. The mission involved several stops at various offshore installations, including the Scott platform, the Paragon MSS1 rig, and the Buzzard complex.
While stationed at the Paragon MSS1, the crew prepared for the next leg of the flight to the Buzzard complex. During this period, the crew was engaged in busy and confusing radio communications regarding changes to passenger payloads. Due to the visual similarity between the complexes, the crew misidentified the Golden Eagle complex as their intended destination.
To facilitate the short flight, the crew opted to fly manually at 500 ft rather than using the Flight Management System (FMS) for lateral navigation. During the approach, the crew received confirmation of deck availability from the Buzzard Helicopter Landing Officer (HLO), which reinforced their incorrect belief that they were approaching the correct location. The helicopter subsequently landed on the Ensco 120 helideck within the Golden Eagle complex, which was unmanned. Upon realizing the error, the commander decided to depart immediately to avoid the risks of remaining on an unmanned deck without fire cover, eventually proceeding to the correct destination without further incident.
The investigation
The investigation examined the crew's navigation methods, the workload during the flight, and the effectiveness of the company's operating procedures. Investigators looked into why the crew did not utilize the FMS, compass, or Rigmap to verify their position. The investigation also reviewed the radio communications that occurred during the pre-departure phase and the pilot's decision-making process regarding the immediate departure from the unintended helideck.
Findings
- The crew relied solely on visual identification to identify the next destination.
- The Golden Eagle complex closely resembled the expected appearance of the Buzzard complex.
- The crew did not use the FMS to confirm the bearing or distance to the Buzzard complex, as required by company procedures.
- High workloads and distractions from radio communications regarding payload changes interrupted the pre-departure checks.
- The co-pilot's limited experience in the area may have contributed to the acceptance of the commander's visual assessment.
- The commander's decision to depart the unmanned deck immediately was driven by a desire to minimize time on deck without fire cover and to alleviate perceived time pressure.