Piper PA-18 Super Cub accident at Biscarrosse-Parentis hydrobase (F-BMSZ)

Accident overview and flight sequence On 26 October 2014 at approximately 16:45 local time, a Piper PA-18 Super Cub registered F-BMSZ, operated by a club, was conducting a general-aviation training flight at the Biscarrosse-Parentis hydrobase in France. The aircraft carried an instructor and a student pilot. During the flight, the student and instructor took off from runway 09 at Biscarrosse-Parentis aerodrome for a water-landing training session. After initial climb, the student climbed to about 900 ft and turned toward the lake to identify the landing axis. During the approach, the instructor initiated a simulated engine-failure exercise. The student adjusted the flight path to land into the wind. On water contact, the seaplane nosed over; the occupants escaped before it inverted and were rescued by a fisherman in a boat. The aircraft was heavily damaged. ## Aircraft configuration and warning system The aircraft was fitted with a four-wheel retractable landing gear that could be extended for runway landings or retracted for water landings. The front cockpit panel included a gear-position alarm system with blue and green lights, an amber advisory light, a two-position gear switch, and a red light indicating gear movement. Below 60 MPH, the amber “GEAR ADVISORY” light flashed and a synthetic voice announced the gear state: “WATER LANDING” when retracted with blue lights, or “GROUND LANDING” when extended with green lights. Each float also had a mechanical indicator showing “UP WATER” or “DOWN LAND.” Pre-flight tests of the visual and audible alarms had been successful. ## Crew experience and club procedures The 76-year-old instructor held a private pilot licence since 1965, an instructor qualification since 1988, and a SEP(H) qualification since 2011. He had about 9,690 flight hours, including roughly 3,000 on type and 40 hours on seaplanes, of which 25 were instruction. The 53-year-old student held a private pilot licence since 2010 and a Canadian SEP(H) qualification from 2011, validated in France in November 2013. She had about 220 flight hours, including 22 on seaplanes and 11 on type, and had made 11 water landings in the two days before the accident. The club’s normal procedures required retracting the gear as soon as possible after takeoff, visually checking the float indicators, confirming the four blue lights, orally confirming gear retraction at the coastline, and performing a sector and landing-axis reconnaissance. ## Investigation findings and contributing factors The BEA concluded that the accident resulted from the instructor’s failure to supervise the pilot’s actions before and during the simulated engine-failure exercise. The pilot had not retracted the landing gear after takeoff, and the instructor did not detect this before starting the exercise. The failure to perform post-takeoff and pre-landing checklists allowed the error to go uncorrected. Contributing factors included the instructor’s mental preoccupation, which reduced his availability under increased workload and improvisation, and the absence of a methodology that would have provided control tools before initiating the exercise.