On December 4, 2015, a Robin DR400-140 (registration F-GAHG) was involved in an aviation accident near La Bresse (88), FR. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The decision to undertake and continue the flight resulted from inadequate flight preparation, a strong desire to reach the planned destination, and a probable overconfidence in the pilot’s ability to fly in deteriorating weather conditions. This summary draws on records from the French Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses (BEA).
A Robin DR400-140 (F-GAHG) collided with terrain near La Bresse on 4 December 2015 during a VFR flight from Chavenay to Colmar. Both occupants died. The BEA attributed the accident to inadequate preparation and continued flight in deteriorating weather.
Flight Details and Accident Sequence On 4 December 2015, a Robin DR400-140 registered F-GAHG, operated by a flying club for personal convenience, departed Chavenay (78) at 15:27 local time (UTC+1) for Colmar Houssen (68) under a VFR flight plan. The aircraft carried a pilot and one passenger. After cruising at flight level 75, the pilot requested weather information for Colmar Houssen from the Basel flight information service at 16:46. The controller provided a METAR indicating overcast conditions at 3,400 ft. The pilot later contacted Strasbourg flight information service around 16:59, stating he would begin descent once he found a break in the clouds. At 17:11, the controller relayed updated weather showing broken clouds at 3,300 ft and overcast at 6,800 ft, noting slight improvement southeast of Colmar. The pilot indicated he would head slightly south. At 17:16, he left the Strasbourg frequency and recontacted Basel. Three minutes later, he reported entering instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). The aircraft collided with terrain shortly thereafter. ## Wreckage and Meteorological Conditions The wreckage was found on a mountainside slope overlooking La Bresse (88) at 3,000 ft altitude. The aircraft struck the ground with wings nearly level and high energy, with continuous flight controls. Propeller damage indicated the engine was producing power at impact, corroborated by a witness who heard the engine running just before the accident. The altimeter was set to QNH 1034. The aircraft was not equipped with a GNSS receiver, and it was not possible to determine if radio navigation instruments were used. No tablet, aeronautical chart, or navigation log was found. Damaged mobile phones could not be used. Only a screenshot of a flight preparation website covering the segment between Épinal and Colmar was recovered at the scene. Wreckage observations and radar data were consistent with a collision with terrain without loss of control. Météo-France estimated that along the route between Chavenay and Colmar, the sky was overcast with the cloud layer top at approximately 4,000 ft. The Vosges massif, with elevations up to 4,500 ft west of Colmar, was within the cloud layer, which could reach 6,000 ft in that area, equivalent to 6,588 ft at QNH 1034. A witness reported the accident site was in thick fog with visibility of about ten meters. The TEMSI France chart at 12:00 UTC indicated a broken or solid layer of cumulus and stratocumulus between 1,500 and 5,000 ft on the route. METARs from Colmar Houssen (elevation 627 ft) at 14:00 and 15:00 UTC reported overcast at 3,400 ft AGL. METARs from Épinal Mirecourt, located before the Vosges massif, at 14:00 and 15:00 UTC indicated a ceiling between 800 and 900 ft. The WINTEM chart at 15:00 UTC reported west to northwest winds of 5 to 10 kt. ## Pilot Background and Flight Planning The pilot began training in a flying club in June 2014 and obtained his private pilot license (PPL(A)) in May 2015 after 49 hours and 35 minutes of flight time. At the time of the accident, he had 67 total flight hours, 66 of which were on the DR400. In the three months prior, he had made three flights totaling 1 hour and 6 minutes. Since obtaining his PPL, he had completed several navigations as pilot-in-command, ranging from 50 to 125 nautical miles. He had noted “return in IMC” next to one navigation in his logbook. Instructors who trained him stated he progressed very quickly and was a serious student. During training, he encountered deteriorating weather on a solo navigation and made the decision to turn back. They added that he had the opportunity to make several flights in the United States in the right seat, including IFR and night flights, but outside the framework of official training. The VFR flight plan filed by the pilot scheduled departure at 14:45. The investigation did not determine why the pilot did not depart until 15:27. On the day of the accident, sunset at Colmar was at 16:38, and nautical night began at 17:14. Instructors indicated the aircraft cruised at 210 km/h, and the great-circle distance between Chavenay and Colmar was 406 km. Not accounting for takeoff and landing procedures, the flight duration was estimated at a minimum of about 1 hour and 50 minutes. A departure at 15:27 therefore did not allow reaching Colmar before nautical night. ## Findings and Conclusion The forecast and observed weather conditions showed that it was difficult, if not impossible, to conduct the flight between Chavenay and Colmar in visual meteorological conditions (VMC). Additionally, the late departure time did not permit reaching the destination before nautical night. The decision to undertake and continue the flight resulted from inadequate flight preparation, a strong desire to reach the planned destination, and a probable overconfidence in the pilot’s ability to fly in deteriorating weather conditions. The BEA noted that in case of loss of external visual references or navigation difficulties, a pilot always has the option to request assistance from air traffic control, which can suggest an alternate aerodrome, a heading to follow, or help avoid terrain. The BEA has published numerous reports on this type of accident, including a safety study “Objective: Destination 1991-1996” and REC Info No. 1/2009, which provides accounts from pilots who experienced similar situations.
Probable cause
The decision to undertake and continue the flight resulted from inadequate flight preparation, a strong desire to reach the planned destination, and a probable overconfidence in the pilot’s ability to fly in deteriorating weather conditions.