What happened
On 13 December 2011, an Air France Airbus A319-111, registration F-GRHS, was conducting a scheduled flight from Hamburg to Paris Charles-de-Gaulle. During the ILS approach to runway 27R, the aircraft encountered significant turbulent wind conditions, including strong lateral components and gusts.
As the aircraft descended, the crew chose to fly the approach manually, disengaging the autopilot and autothrust. This decision, combined with the severe turbulence, resulted in an intense period of manual flying characterized by large, frequent sidestick inputs to maintain control. As the aircraft descended below 200 ft, the approach became objectively destabilized, with the airspeed rising significantly above the target speed and the aircraft deviating from the glide path.
At approximately 20 ft above the runway, a sudden roll from right to left forced the pilot flying to focus on lateral control. Consequently, the flare was initiated much later than standard—at approximately 15 ft—and with insufficient amplitude. The aircraft touched down with a high vertical speed and excessive airspeed, resulting in a hard landing that damaged the main landing gear.
The investigation
The BEA investigation focused on the flight parameters, meteorological data, and crew performance. Investigators analyzed FDR data, which revealed that the aircraft experienced rapid wind variations, including significant changes in headwind and lateral wind components. The investigation also examined the crew's decision-making process regarding the stabilized approach criteria and the use of automated systems. Additionally, the investigation identified a malfunction in the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) that rendered the audio data unreadable, a known issue with that specific series of recorders.
Findings
- The primary cause of the hard landing was excessive vertical speed at touchdown, driven by a late flare initiated at 15 ft, preceded by pitch-down inputs at 25 ft and 20 ft.
- The aircraft was flying at an excessive airspeed, approximately 17 kt above the target Vapp, at the moment of touchdown.
- The pilot flying experienced an overwhelming workload due to the necessity of manual flight in heavy turbulence and the decision to fly without autothrust.
- The pilot monitoring failed to call for an aborted approach despite observing clear destabilization criteria, such as airspeed deviations and bank angle changes.
- The decision to fly manually and the practice of mentally adjusting target speeds rather than updating the flight management computer removed critical flight references for the crew.