Beech C23 Sundowner accident in Saint-François, Guadeloupe (F-OJCA)

Accident Overview and Flight Sequence On 31 December 2018, a Beech C23 Sundowner registered F-OJCA was operating a private navigation flight from the Saint-François aerodrome in Guadeloupe to the Saintes aerodrome. The aircraft carried a pilot and two passengers. The pre-flight inspection and fuel sumps were checked by the pilot before the passengers arrived at 11:30 local time. After engine start and taxiing to runway 11, the aircraft took off with full power. At approximately 300 feet, the pilot observed a reduction in engine RPM. The aircraft began to lose altitude, and the pilot elected to make a forced landing in the water as close to the shore as possible. The aircraft landed in shallow water about 15 meters from the shore, and the nose landing gear broke during the impact. The pilot and both passengers sustained minor injuries, and the aircraft was heavily damaged. ## Aircraft, Engine, and Maintenance Information The aircraft was rented by the pilot from MG Management, the owner. The last entry in the aircraft logbook was dated 7 December 2018, although several witnesses stated that the aircraft had flown regularly after that date. Maintenance was performed by Wood Aerotech based on the logbook flight hours and the manufacturer's maintenance program. A 100-hour inspection had been completed in November 2018. At that time, the engine had accumulated 609 flight hours. Examination of the engine at the accident site showed that the carburetor air intake duct was damaged and crushed in places, and the engine cowling was also damaged. The cowling may have impacted the duct during the accident. The BEA did not examine the engine. ## Pilot and Operational Context The pilot was 59 years old and held a French Commercial Pilot Licence (CPL) with a single-engine piston (SEP) rating, as well as a U.S. CPL with SEP, multi-engine piston (MEP), and instrument (IR) ratings. He had more than 13,000 total flight hours and approximately 40 hours in the three months preceding the accident, all on single-engine piston aircraft. The passengers stated that they had engaged the pilot for a paid flight to the Saintes and had previously taken two or three tourist flights in Guadeloupe with him. They were not aware of the difference between this type of operation and commercial air transport. The passengers reported that the pilot appeared rushed, did not perform engine tests before takeoff, and repeatedly told them that seatbelts were not necessary. No one on board was wearing a seatbelt at the time of the accident. ## Aerodrome and Recorded Evidence The Saint-François aerodrome has a paved runway 11/29, 600 meters long and 20 meters wide, located on the south coast of Guadeloupe about 300 meters from the shore. The published VAC chart procedure for takeoff on runway 11 required maintaining the runway centerline until 500 feet, then turning right in climb toward 1,000 feet to avoid overflying coastal houses. A passenger video recorded the flight from runway alignment to the forced landing. Audio analysis showed the propeller reached 2,400 rpm during the takeoff roll, consistent with nominal engine and propeller ranges. Seventeen seconds after rotation, the RPM dropped abruptly from 2,400 to 1,900 rpm during initial climb. The RPM then became unstable, fluctuating between 1,000 and 1,900 rpm. The stall warning sounded repeatedly for ten seconds after rotation, then continuously from one second after the RPM drop until landing. The fuel pressure indicator remained in the green arc throughout the flight. ## Findings and Safety Observations Because the BEA did not conduct an in-depth examination of the aircraft, the cause of the engine power loss could not be determined. The BEA noted that pre-takeoff engine tests might have allowed the pilot to detect an anomaly. The nose landing gear failure was probably caused by contact with rocks on the bottom of the water. Given the situation and the aerodrome environment, a forced water landing near the shore was the only option available to the pilot. The accident flight was conducted outside any commercial or professional structure. The passengers were probably unaware of the differences between commercial air transport and non-commercial aviation and the potential safety consequences. A commercial framework would likely have encouraged the pilot to perform engine tests and verify passenger seatbelt use, and would have promoted more rigorous logbook maintenance, which is used to schedule maintenance interventions.