Flight Sequence
On 3 June 2015, a Cessna T210N Centurion II (registration N9533Y) departed from Angers-Marcé aerodrome at 16:05 local time, bound for Troyes-Barberey aerodrome. Shortly after beginning descent from flight level 115 toward Troyes-Barberey, the engine stopped. The pilot performed the prescribed checks and actions, but the engine did not restart. Judging that he could not reach the destination, the pilot diverted to Montargis aerodrome. He passed overhead and joined a left downwind leg for runway 23, landing with the landing gear partially extended. The aircraft came to a stop on the runway, 400 meters before its end.
Pilot Information
The pilot held a PPL(A) license since 1980 and had accumulated 2,011 total flight hours, including 123 on the Centurion. His last flight on this type was on 5 March 2013. He had flown 1 hour 10 minutes on 29 May with the responsible person of the company owning N9533Y, and then 12 hours on the accident aircraft in the two days preceding and the day of the accident. The pilot also owned a Cessna Columbia 400 (fixed-gear), acquired in January 2014, which was temporarily unavailable for maintenance. He had rented N9533Y for professional travel that week. The pilot stated that he did not note any inconsistency between the fuel indicators, the totalizer flowmeter, and the refueling amounts. He added that outside of refueling, he did not visually check the fuel quantity in the tanks before each flight. He reset the totalizer after each refueling and based his fuel management primarily on the totalizer. He typically positioned the fuel selector on BOTH.
Aircraft Information
The aircraft was equipped with two wing tanks with a total usable fuel capacity of 87 US gallons (329 liters). The filler caps were not key-locked and the drain valves had no anti-theft system. Two cockpit indicators showed fuel remaining in each tank. There was no low-fuel warning light or audible alarm. An electronic flowmeter/totalizer indicated real-time consumption and total fuel used since the pilot's initialization. The fuel selector had three positions: LEFT, BOTH, and RIGHT. The flight manual recommended a visual check of fuel quantity in each tank before every flight. A folding step and a wooden dipstick were permanently installed in the aircraft. Post-accident, both tanks were found empty. No fuel traces were found near the aircraft. The fuel system was checked and no leaks or technical anomalies were found. No fuel gauge or system malfunctions were recorded in the logbook since early 2015. Engine post-accident inspection revealed no malfunction. No issues with tank capacity or hourly consumption were found after the aircraft was returned to service.
The landing gear was a retractable tricycle type, hydraulically actuated. A single green light on the panel indicated all three gear down and locked; an amber light indicated gear up and locked. An audible gear warning sounded when engine manifold pressure was below 15 inches (approaching idle). The pilot did not attempt emergency gear extension. An external mirror on the right wing strut allowed confirmation of the nose and right main gear position. After the accident, the gear extended normally and the green light illuminated. No gear malfunction was found during return to service.
Investigation Findings
The investigation was unable to establish a precise fuel consumption balance for the last three days due to inconsistencies between the pilot's statements and the flight logs. The empty tanks led to engine stoppage due to fuel exhaustion; no technical failure was found. The inconsistencies regarding fuel management suggest an operational cause for the engine stoppage. Possible explanations include organization and conduct of a high number of flights in three days within a professional context, absence of visual fuel level checks before each flight, and insufficient in-flight monitoring of fuel quantity indicators. Theft of fuel during a stopover could not be completely excluded. The delayed landing gear extension, in the stress of the engine failure, may be explained by the pilot's low recent experience on retractable-gear aircraft, incomplete pre-landing checks, and the likely position of the power lever above the gear warning threshold.
Conclusion
The engine stopped due to lack of fuel; both tanks were empty. No technical anomalies were found. The investigation highlighted operational factors related to fuel management and the landing gear extension.