2018 Cirrus SR22 GTS accident at Beaubery (F-HUGE)

Accident overview and immediate consequences On 10 December 2018, a Cirrus SR22 GTS registered F-HUGE was destroyed in a collision with the ground at Beaubery, in the Saône-et-Loire department (71), France. The accident occurred at approximately 11:20 local time. The pilot and two passengers on board were killed. The aircraft was operated by Aéroclub AGILE for a navigation flight. The BEA identified the probable cause as loss of control in flight without external visual references, followed by collision with the ground. ## Flight plan, crew, and departure The pilot had planned a VFR round trip from Lognes-Émerainville (77) to Villefranche-Tarare (69). He was accompanied by two passengers: a pilot-instructor friend seated in the right-hand seat, who conducted all radio communications, and a family member seated in the rear. The pilot, who was a company manager, was travelling to Villefranche-sur-Saône for a professional appointment. The flight was intended to be made in a Cirrus SR22 belonging to an aéroclub at Lognes, of which the pilot was a member. On arrival at the airfield, the aircraft was found parked at the back of the hangar. To save preparation time, the pilot chose to depart in the Cirrus SR22 GTS F-HUGE, belonging to another aéroclub in a neighbouring hangar, of which he was also a member. The pilot took off at 10:05. The first part of the flight was conducted with the autopilot in lateral NAV mode, at altitudes frequently varied between 2,500 ft and 3,500 ft, with altimeter settings referenced to QNH 1028 hPa. ## Flight development and loss of control At 10:38, midway through the route, the pilot began a descent toward 1,500 ft and made rapid changes to the autopilot settings, alternating between NAV and HDG modes and selecting different headings. These actions led to a U-turn during which the aircraft reached a minimum height of 330 ft before turning west. The pilot then disconnected the autopilot and flight director and began a climb. After a 360° turn, at 5,000 ft, the right-seat passenger contacted Clermont SIV. He stated that their intention was to pass above the cloud layer and requested weather information for Lyon-Bron (69) and Saint-Yan (71). The pilot then took a northerly course and activated the flight director in HDG mode. From this point, the altimeter was set to standard pressure 1013.25 hPa and was not changed for the remainder of the flight. At 10:58, the pilot made a U-turn and resumed the route toward Villefranche-Tarare under autopilot in lateral NAV mode at FL065. A video taken by the rear passenger showed that the aircraft was then above the cloud layer. The aircraft was subsequently established at FL075. Around 11:10, while in contact with the Saint-Yan tower controller, the right-seat passenger requested and received weather information for Valence-Chabeuil, which reported visibility greater than 10 km and an overcast ceiling at 5,200 ft. This was the last radio exchange between the aircraft and the Saint-Yan control tower. At 11:11, the pilot made a lateral control input altering the heading by approximately 30° to the left. During this manoeuvre, the aircraft banked 45° to the left. The pilot then disconnected the autopilot, which removed the opposing control force. He continued in manual flight for one minute before re-engaging the autopilot in lateral HDG mode and gradually resuming a southerly course (160°). The pilot then selected different flight levels (FL070 and then FL075 again) before beginning a descent at 11:16 toward FL045 in vertical speed mode, set at -1,000 ft/min. At 11:18, passing FL060, the pilot made a further heading alteration of approximately 20° to the right (course 180°) in lateral HDG mode and selected FL040. At 11:20, the pilot selected FL030 and a vertical speed of -500 ft/min. At 11:20:20, the descent was interrupted near 4,500 ft by the selection of a vertical speed of 0 ft/min, then +500 ft/min and FL080. The aircraft climbed. Twenty seconds later, while the autopilot was executing the climb with an attitude of approximately 3°, the selected vertical speed increased toward +950 ft/min. The pilot again overrode the autopilot by banking the aircraft 45° to the left. He then disconnected the autopilot and flight director. He subsequently made a right turn followed by a left turn with bank angles of approximately 30 to 40°. During the left turn, the bank and attitude were not stabilised, but the altitude remained between 4,300 and 4,600 ft. At 11:22:10, the pilot began a left turn with a bank angle exceeding 90° and a nose-down attitude reaching 30°. The aircraft struck the ground with high energy approximately thirty seconds later. ## Meteorological information Météo-France information indicated that the pilot had consulted weather information on the Aéroweb website at approximately 05:45 and 06:45 before leaving home and had updated the data at the aéroclub facilities before departure. An aéroclub instructor stated that he had spoken briefly with the pilot about the planned flight and, knowing the destination area, had warned him of the likelihood of encountering weather conditions that would not permit continuation of the flight in VMC, particularly in the morning. The pilot reportedly replied that if that were the case, he would try to “pass underneath.” The 10:00 TEMSI FRANCE low-level chart (SFC–FL150), available from 08:00 before departure, showed that most of the route, except the departure, lay within a single dashed zone. Key elements along the route included broken and locally scattered cumulus and stratocumulus with bases between 1,500 ft and 3,000 ft and tops between 5,000 ft and 8,000 ft; rain and showers; moderate icing between 3,000/4,000 ft and 8,000 ft; and visibility greater than 8 km, locally reduced to 5–8 km, probably due to rain. An instructor flying IFR in a TB20 at the time of the accident reported operating at FL070 near Saint-Yan and observing light icing on his aircraft. The 10:00 WINTEM chart forecast winds along the route of 10–25 kt from the north-west at FL020 and 20–25 kt from the north-west at FL050. Pre-departure METAR and TAF data for Saint-Yan (09:30) reported visibility greater than 10 km, scattered cloud at 2,300 ft, broken cloud at 5,400 ft and 6,200 ft, and temporary rain showers, reduced visibility to 4 km, and overcast cloud at 2,100 ft. The 06:00 TAF for Saint-Yan reported visibility greater than 10 km, broken cloud at 2,800 ft, and temporary reduced visibility to 4 km, rain showers, broken cloud at 2,100 ft, and few cumulus congestus at 3,800 ft between 07:00 and 16:00. Pre-departure METAR and TAF data for Lyon Saint-Exupéry (09:30) reported visibility greater than 10 km, few cloud at 3,420 ft, and broken cloud at 6,820 ft. The 06:22 amended TAF reported visibility greater than 10 km and broken cloud at 4,820 ft. At the time of the accident, the 11:30 METAR for Saint-Yan reported visibility greater than 10 km, scattered cloud at 2,400 ft, broken cloud at 3,200 ft, overcast cloud at 5,300 ft, and temporary reduced visibility to 4 km, rain showers, and overcast cloud at 2,100 ft. ## Observations and synthesis A photograph taken by the right-seat passenger at approximately 10:20 showed the aircraft flying below the cloud layer at 2,500 ft in cruise. Around 10:55, while in contact with Clermont SIV, the right-seat passenger stated that they were at 5,000 ft, in sight of the ground, above scattered cloud, and attempting to pass above the cloud layer to cross at 6,500 ft. He requested weather information for Lyon-Bron and Saint-Yan. The controller asked him to remain in VMC and recommended that he “be careful” because “afterwards, you will have to descend.” The controller provided METAR-based information for Lyon-Bron: visibility greater than 10 km, broken cloud at 5,460 ft and 6,060 ft, and temporary few cumulus congestus at 3,160 ft and broken cloud at 3,660 ft. For Saint-Yan, the controller reported visibility greater than 10 km, broken cloud at 2,300 ft, and overcast cloud at 3,300 ft. Around 10:57, after reaching 6,500 ft above the cloud layer (confirmed by the rear passenger’s video), the right-seat passenger told the controller that they were at that location.