What happened
On 13 February 2019, a De Havill and DHC-6 Twin Otter, registration PJ-WII, arrived at Saint-Barthélemy airport from Saint Martin Princess Juliana airport. The aircraft, operated by Windward Island Airways International, landed on runway 10 and taxied to apron position P2.
As the aircraft came to a stop, the crew applied the parking brake and feathered the propeller blades. A ramp agent, acting as a marshaller, guided the aircraft into position and placed chocks around the nose gear. After securing the nose wheel, the marshaller began walking around the front of the aircraft to signal a contact in the terminal building. While walking backwards along the right side of the airframe, the agent passed the right engine. Despite the anti-collision lights still being active, the propeller was still rotating. The agent was struck on the head by a propeller blade, resulting in one serious injury.
The investigation
The investigation examined the aircraft's arrival sequence, ground handling procedures, and the physical environment of the apron. Investigators reviewed surveillance video of the event and analyzed the company's ground handling manuals. The investigation also looked into the operational pressures at Saint-Barthélemy airport, noting that high traffic volumes often require short turnaround times, which can lead to time-pressured ground operations.
Furthermore, the BEA examined the safety practices of the operator and the ground handling company. It was noted that previous safety inspections had identified a pattern of ground personnel walking around aircraft while propellers were still in motion or anti-collision lights were active, often as a means to save time. The investigation also reviewed the physical state and recent history of the ramp agent.
Findings
The investigation established that the primary cause of the accident was the ramp agent's failure to maintain a safe distance from the propeller danger zone and her decision to move around the aircraft before the propellers had come to a complete stop.
Several contributing factors were identified:
- The agent was distracted by signaling to someone in the terminal and was not looking in the direction of her path.
- The agent's probable state of fatigue, following a late night, and the possible consumption of psychoactive substances the previous night.
- A culture of non-compliance driven by environmental pressure, where ground personnel had developed habits of bypassing safety steps to meet tight turnaround constraints.
- The engine and propellers continued to rotate for a period after the blades had been feathered, a factor noted in the operator's manual.