What happened
On 28 June 2019, a Piper PA28 RT 201T Turbo Arrow IV, registration F-GMSE, was performing a cross-country training flight from Dunkerque Les Moeres toward Saint-Nazaire Montoir. The aircraft was occupied by a pilot, an instructor, and two passengers.
The day prior to the accident, the crew had encountered a landing gear indication issue where the nose gear green light failed to illuminate. To resolve this, the instructor performed an emergency landing gear extension procedure from memory. During this process, the instructor interrupted the sequence to manage the flight path, which resulted in the landing gear selector switch being left in the UP position and the landing gear circuit breaker being tripped.
On the day of the accident, while taxiing for takeoff at Île d’Yeu, the crew noticed the red "Warning gear unsafe" light and an intermittent aural warning. However, they incorrectly attributed these warnings to a malfunction of the nose gear switch rather than the selector switch position. During the takeoff roll on runway 32, the nose of the aircraft dropped, and the landing gear retracted as soon as the struts were no and longer compressed by the aircraft's weight. The aircraft subsequently slid down the runway, coming to rest approximately 560 meters from the threshold, resulting in severe damage to the aircraft.
The investigation
The BEA examined the aircraft's landing gear system, which is hydraulically operated by an electric pump. The investigation focused on the sequence of events following the previous day's gear malfunction and the crew's response to the warnings during taxiing. Investigators also reviewed the aircraft's Pilot Operating Handbook (POH) and the club's specific checklists, noting that the procedures did not require a check of the landing gear selector switch position during pre-flight or approach phases.
Findings
- The instructor performed the emergency extension procedure from memory based on a different aircraft type (Socata TB20), leading to the omission of critical steps.
- The landing gear selector switch was left in the UP position following the interrupted procedure from the previous flight.
- The crew misidentified the cause of the cockpit warnings during taxiing, believing they were seeing a nose gear switch failure rather than an incorrect selector switch position.
- The aircraft's checklists and the manufacturer's POH lacked a specific requirement to verify the landing gear selector switch position during pre-flight or landing preparations.
- The manufacturer had not updated the POH procedures following a service bulletin regarding the removal of the automatic landing gear extension system.