Casualties unknown

2010-12-26: Boeing 737-400 and Boeing 737-400 (HL7517 and JA8998) — Air Busan Co., Ltd. and JAL Express Co., Ltd. — Fukuoka Airport, JP

Fukuoka Airport, JP

On December 26, 2010, a Boeing 737-400 and Boeing 737-400 (registration HL7517 and JA8998) operated by Air Busan Co., Ltd. and JAL Express Co., Ltd. was involved in an aviation accident near Fukuoka Airport, JP. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: It is probable that this serious incident occurred because the flight crew of the departing aircraft (HL7517), to which the local controller instructed to hold short of the runway, failed to recognize part of the instruction and misinterpreted that they had… This summary draws on records from the Japan Transport Safety Board (JTSB).

Sourcesthe Japan Transport Safety Board (JTSB)Primary reportUpdated 1785096185Data APIEditorial standards
Boeing 737-400 and Boeing 737-400
Photo: San Diego Air & Space Museum Archives / Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

On December 26, 2010, an Air Busan Boeing 737-400 entered runway 34 at Fukuoka Airport while a JAL Express Boeing 737-400 was landing, prompting a go-around. No injuries or damage occurred.

Incident Overview

On December 26, 2010, at approximately 11:34 JST, a serious incident occurred on runway 34 at Fukuoka Airport involving two Boeing 737-400 aircraft. The first aircraft, registered HL7517 and operated by Air Busan Co., Ltd., was preparing for takeoff as scheduled flight 141 to Gimhae International Airport. The second aircraft, registered JA8998 and operated by JAL Express Co., Ltd., was approaching the airport as Japan Airlines International Co., Ltd. flight 3530 and had received a landing clearance.

Sequence of Events

The incident began when HL7517 was taxiing toward runway 34 after receiving taxi instructions from ground control. At 11:29:28, the ground controller instructed HL7517 to taxi to intersection W8 via taxiway C4 and parallel taxiway B. At 11:32:39, the aircraft was told to contact the local controller. Upon contacting the local controller at 11:33:02, the crew initially misidentified their flight number but corrected it. At 11:33:14, the local controller issued an instruction: "ROGER, HOLD SHORT OF RUNWAY 34 VIA W8." The crew replied, "RUNWAY 34 VIA W8, ABL141," and began turning onto taxiway W8. However, instead of holding short, the crew continued onto the runway, turning left and aligning with the centerline at 11:34:11.

Meanwhile, JA8998 had been cleared to land on runway 34 at 11:32:11. As it approached, the local controller noticed HL7517 entering the runway and instructed JA8998 to go around at 11:34:08. At that time, JA8998 was about 1.2 nautical miles from the threshold at an altitude of approximately 350 feet. The crew of JA8998 executed the go-around, climbing from about 300 feet. At 11:34:28, the HL7517 crew asked for takeoff clearance, but the local controller replied, "NEGATIVE, I SAID YOU HOLD SHORT OF RUNWAY 34 VIA W8 DUE TO INBOUND TRAFFIC." The crew acknowledged their misunderstanding.

Aircraft and Occupants

HL7517 carried 153 persons: a pilot in command, five other crewmembers, and 147 passengers. JA8998 carried 108 persons: a pilot in command, four other crewmembers, and 103 passengers. No injuries were reported, and neither aircraft sustained damage.

Communication Details

ATC recordings and flight data revealed that the HL7517 crew had earlier been asked by the ground controller if they would accept an intersection departure from W8, which they agreed to. The crew later stated they believed the controller was trying to expedite their departure ahead of the inbound traffic. The hold-short instruction included phraseology that indicated a taxiing route, which may have contributed to the misinterpretation. The local controller did not confirm the read-back of the hold instruction.

Probable cause

It is probable that this serious incident occurred because the flight crew of the departing aircraft (HL7517), to which the local controller instructed to hold short of the runway, failed to recognize part of the instruction and misinterpreted that they had obtained a clearance to enter the runway, while the local controller did not confirm the read-back of the instruction, resulting in a situation where HL7517 entered the runway, causing the arriving aircraft (JA8998) which had earlier obtained a landing clearance from the same controller to attempt to land on the same runway. Probable contributing factors to the misinterpretation of the HL7517 flight crew that they obtained a clearance to enter the runway are as follows: (1) There was an inquiry about the possibility of an intersection departure. (2) HL7517 was urged to confirm whether preparations for departure were completed just before the holding instruction. (3) The flight crew of HL7517 had thought that the controller was trying to have them depart before the landing of incoming JA8998. (4) The holding instruction included an air traffic control phraseology which indicates a taxiing route.

Investigation report by the Japan Transport Safety Board (JTSB). Original record: https://jtsb.mlit.go.jp/eng-air_report/HL7517_JA8998.pdf. This page is a structured re-presentation; facts and quotes are in the Japan Transport Safety Board (JTSB) - Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism.