Incident Overview
On June 3, 2015, at 13:24 JST, a serious incident occurred at Naha Airport involving three aircraft: a CH-47J helicopter of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (registration 57-4493), a Boeing 737-800 operated by All Nippon Airways (JA80AN), and a Boeing 737-400 operated by Japan Transocean Air (JA8938). The Japan Transport Safety Board investigated the incident and issued its report on April 27, 2017.
Sequence of Events
Japan Transocean Air flight 610, a Boeing 737-400 (JTA Aircraft), was approaching runway 18 for landing. All Nippon Airways flight 1694, a Boeing 737-800 (ANA Aircraft), had commenced its take-off roll on the same runway after receiving take-off clearance from the aerodrome control tower. However, the ANA Aircraft rejected its take-off because a CH-47J helicopter (SDF Aircraft) was approaching the runway after taking off from taxiway A-5. Despite the tower instructing the JTA Aircraft to execute a go-around, the JTA Aircraft landed on runway 18 before the ANA Aircraft had vacated. The JTA Aircraft had 44 persons on board, the ANA Aircraft had 83, and the SDF Aircraft had seven. No injuries were reported.
Probable Causes
The serious incident occurred when the ANA Aircraft rejected take-off on runway 18 because the SDF Aircraft crossed in front of it, and the JTA Aircraft landed on the runway before the ANA Aircraft vacated. The pilot of the JTA Aircraft, having received landing clearance and recognizing the ANA Aircraft on the runway during the flare, judged that a safe landing was possible based on his experience and landing performance calculations. The go-around instruction from the tower came after the JTA Aircraft had already landed and initiated reverse thrust. The ANA Aircraft's rejected take-off resulted from the pilot's inability to determine the SDF Aircraft's flight direction and a perceived serious danger. The SDF Aircraft's pilots misunderstood the take-off clearance intended for the ANA Aircraft as their own, partly due to failure to hear the transmission accurately and lack of mutual confirmation. The tower did not correct the SDF Aircraft's incorrect read-back because the VHF receiver characteristics prevented hearing it.
Conclusions
No safety recommendations were issued in the report. The investigation focused on the sequence of events and probable causes without apportioning blame.