What happened
In the early hours of November 30, 2019, an Airbus A320-214, registration JA806P, operated by Peach Aviation Limited, was cleared to land on Runway 34L at Tokyo International Airport. At the time, the aircraft was carrying 164 passengers and 6 crewmembers.
Simultaneously, maintenance work was being conducted on the adjacent Runway B, which was closed for pavement measurement. To allow aircraft using the active Runway A to cross the closed Runway B, specific towing routes had been established. Around 01:02, a work vehicle carrying two subcontractors began crossing one of these established routes. After receiving clearance to cross the B7 towing route, the vehicle driver proceeded toward the intersection of Runway A and Runway B.
Without requesting permission from Air Traffic Control to enter the active runway strip, the work vehicle entered the protected area of Runway 34L. As the Airbus A320-214 passed the runway threshold and prepared for touchdown, the vehicle continued across the runway. The aircraft landed and initiated reverse thrust while the vehicle was still on the runway surface. The vehicle eventually vacated the runway strip at approximately 01:03:51, shortly after the aircraft had passed the halfway marking.
The investigation
The Japan Transport Safety Board (JTSB) examined air traffic control communications, flight data recorder information, and GPS records from the work vehicle. The investigation also reviewed the training materials provided to the construction workers and the coordination diagrams used for the night works. Investigators looked into the procedures for requesting runway crossing clearances and the visual monitoring capabilities of the controllers on duty.
Findings
- The primary cause of the incident was that the work vehicle entered the runway strip without obtaining clearance from the controller.
- The driver of the vehicle operated under a misunderstanding of the work area boundaries, believing that because the intersection was marked as closed on their coordination diagram, no specific radio contact was required to cross it.
- The safety training materials provided to the workers failed to explicitly state that even if a crossing route is authorized, a separate clearance is mandatory to enter the active runway strip.
- The controller's attention was momentarily diverted to instructing other departing aircraft, which prevented the immediate detection of the vehicle's unauthorized movement onto Runway 34L.
- A previous incident involving a different contractor just 25 days prior had highlighted similar misunderstandings regarding runway intersections, yet the necessary instructional revisions had not yet been fully integrated into the workers' field training.